IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DIVISION, DISTRICT OF UTAH

RONALD T. GRANGE, JR., individually, :

and in his capacity as the Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF :

RONALD T. GRANGE, SR., and APRIL Civil No. 1:07-cv-00107

GRANGE HOLMES, the heirs at law,

RULING & ORDER

Plaintiffs, :

JUDGE TENA CAMPBELL

VS.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE BROOKE C.

WELLS

MYLAN LABORATORIES, INC., MYLAN TECHNOLOGIES, INC., and ENTITY DOES I THROUGH VI,

Defendants.

Currently pending before this Court, is defendants', Mylan Inc., Mylan Technologies Inc., and Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (collectively referred to as "Mylan"), motion to compel.¹ For the reasons now set forth herein and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, defendants' motion to compel is granted and plaintiffs are hereby ordered to produce the box of Mylan's Fentanyl Transdermal System ("MFTS") patches currently at issue.

¹Document No. 82.

I. Background

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that Ronald T. Grange Sr. ("decedent") died as a result of fentanyl toxicity caused by his use of a fentanyl transdermal patch produced by Mylan.² On April 3, 2009, through its First Request For Production of Documents, defendants sought information regarding any of the decedent's remaining fentanyl patch boxes still in the plaintiffs' possession.³ Specifically, defendants requested production of the "box received by the decedent with the script for fentanyl."⁴ In response, plaintiffs indicated that they were in possession of two empty fentanyl patch boxes but did not have any other Mylan containers or packaging.⁵

Thereafter, on January 7, 2010, the personal representative of decedent's estate, Ronald Grange Jr. ("Mr. Grange"), was deposed. During his deposition, Mr. Grange referenced several cardboard boxes that he had removed from the decedent's apartment, and indicated that inside one of the larger boxes he observed a smaller box of Fentanyl patches.⁶ Mr. Grange further stated that if you "shake" the fentanyl box "there's something in there." He indicated that the larger box containing the smaller

²Complaint; Document No. 2.

³Defendants' First Request For Production of Documents, Document No. 88-2.

⁴Defendants' First Request For Production of Documents, Request 9; Document No. 88-2.

⁵ Plaintiffs' Responses And Objections To Defendants' First Request For Production, Document 86-3.

⁶Deposition of Ronald T. Grange, January 7, 2010, pg. 90-91; Docket No. 83-2.

Q: But obviously when you were going through those two boxes at some point after you got them home you observed a box of Fentanyl inside one of the larger boxes.

A: Correct.

⁷ Deposition of Ronald T. Grange, January 7, 2010, pg. 91; Document No. 83-2.

Fentanyl box had been sealed with duct tape and was still in his possession.⁸ Based upon Mr. Grange's statements, defendants' counsel made a request for production of the Fentanyl box and alerted plaintiff of the potential for spoliation if the seal was disturbed prior to production.⁹ Thereafter, on March 15, 2010¹⁰ and March 30, 2010¹¹ defendants again provided plaintiffs' counsel with written requests to produce the Fentanyl box to which Mr. Grange had referred in his deposition.

Based upon plaintiffs' failure to produce the box, defendants then filed their pending motion to compel requesting immediate production of the box referenced in Mr. Grange's deposition allegedly containing the Mylan patches at issue in this litigation.¹²

In response, plaintiffs submitted the April 12, 2010, Declaration of Ronald T. Grange in which Mr. Grange states that on the day of his January 7, 2010, deposition he was "very nervous" and "could not concentrate." As a result, Mr. Grange declares that his "testimony was mistaken" and that after his father's death he actually threw

Deposition of Ronald T. Grange, January 7, 2010, pg. 65; Docket No. 83-2.

⁸Deposition of Ronald T. Grange, January 7, 2010, pg. 94-95; Docket No. 83-2.

Q: Is the larger box that the Fentanyl box is in, is it sealed in some fashion?

A: Yes

Q: How is it sealed.

A: Tape. Duct tape.

Q: I would request that the larger box that the Fentanyl box or boxes may be in not be disturbed because I'm going to make a request that the larger box be brought to me here at a later date in Salt Lake City were it can be opened by the parties together, okay?

A: Yes.

¹⁰Document No. 83-3.

¹¹First Supplemental Request For Production; Document No. 83-4.

¹²Document No. 82.

¹³Declaration of Ronald Grange Jr. ¶ 3; Document No. 86-2.

away the leftover fentanyl patches and sent the empty patch boxes to his attorneys.¹⁴ Plaintiffs further contend they have no documents or tangible items responsive the defendants' discovery request and accordingly the motion should be denied.¹⁵ III. Analysis

Mylan has made repeated formal and informal requests for production of any and all boxes containing fentanyl patches in plaintiffs' possession. To date, no boxes have been produced despite sworn statements as to their existence. Of additional concern is the conflicting testimony regarding the alleged contents of the box and whether or not the box is still in Mr. Grange's possession or has in fact been turned over to his attorneys. Such conflict does not defeat the motion to compel, but instead only underscores the need for production of the box so that the contents thereof may be inspected.¹⁶

Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendants' motion to compel. Mylan's request for production of the box is consistent with plaintiffs' general duty to disclose information that is relevant to this litigation and the claims and defenses presented.¹⁷ Furthermore, given the conflicting information provided in the document request, deposition and declaration the Court finds it is appropriate for plaintiffs to produce any boxes in their possession that may be responsive to defendants' requests.

¹⁴Declaration of Ronald Grange Jr. ¶4; Document No. 86-2.

¹⁵Additionally, plaintiffs argue that Mylan's motion is procedurally improper and premature. The Court, however, finds such procedural objections unpersuasive in that plaintiffs responded to Mylan's First Supplemental Document Request on April 6, 2010, prior to the time they filed an opposition to Mylan's motion yet still failed to produce the box requested.

¹⁶Burns v. Board of County Commissioners of Jackson County, 330 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir.).

¹⁷Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.

Defendants' counsel to submit, for the Court's review, an affidavit of reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing their motion to compel.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT: Brosse E. Wells

Brooke C. Wells

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern Division	District of	Utah
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	2000 HAY 14 P 13: 35 JUDGMEN	NT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
V.	DISTRICT REPORT	
Pablo Nieto-Cruz	BY: Case Numbe	r: DUTX1:08CR000142
	OLYGIY OLYGAN Numbe	r: 16048-081
	Spencer Ric	e, FPD
THE DEFENDANT:	Defendant's Attor	ney
pleaded guilty to count(s) Counts 1 & 2 c	of indictment.	
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was accepted by the court.		
was found guilty on count(s) after a plea of not guilty.		
The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offen	ises:	
- 사용하다 (2015년) 1월 1일	Methamphetamine With Intent to eviously Removed Alien pages 2 through100	Distribute 1 2 f this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to
Count(s)	is are dismissed on	the motion of the United States.
It is ordered that the defendant must notif or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, the defendant must notify the court and United St	fy the United States attorney for this and special assessments imposed by ates attorney of material changes in	district within 30 days of any change of name, resident this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution economic circumstances.
	5/12/2010 Date of Imposition Signature of Judg	L Campbell
	Tena Campl Name of Judge	

AO 245B	(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in Criminal Case
	Sheet 2 Imprisonment

Judgment — Page 2 of

10

DEFENDANT: Pablo Nieto-Cruz

CASE NUMBER: DUTX1:08CR000142

IMPRISO	ONIVEENE		
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Unite total term of:	ed States Bureau of Pri	isons to be imprisoned for a	
43 months			
The court makes the following recommendations to the Burea	u of Prisons:		
The court recommends defendant be placed in a facility in the	e state of Arizona.		
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States	s Marshal.		
The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal fo	r this district:		
at a.m p.m.	on		•
as notified by the United States Marshal.			
☐ The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the in	stitution designated by	the Bureau of Prisons:	
before 2 p.m. on	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
as notified by the United States Marshal.			
as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.			
RET	ΓURN		
I have executed this judgment as follows:			
Defendant delivered on	to		
at, w ith a certified c	opy of this judgment.		
		UNITED STATES MARSH	AL
	Ву	DEPUTY UNITED STATES MA	ARSHAL

AO 245B

DEFENDANT: Pablo Nieto-Cruz

CASE NUMBER: DUTX1:08CR000142

Judgment—Page 3 of 10

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of:

60 months.

The defendant must report to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall register with the state sex offender registration agency in the state where the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (Check, if applicable.)

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional conditions on the attached page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- 2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- 3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;
- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- 5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons:
- 6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment;
- 7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- 8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;
- 9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- 11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- 12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and
- as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

AO 245B

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Shee: 3C — Supervised Release

Judgment-Page

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DEFENDANT: Pablo Nieto-Cruz

CASE NUMBER: DUTX1:08CR000142

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

The defendant shall not illegally reenter the United States.

AO 245B

DEFENDANT: Pablo Nieto-Cruz

CASE NUMBER: DUTX1:08CR000142

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

Judgment — Page

of

10

5

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

гот	CALS	<u>Assessi</u> \$ 200.00				<u>Fine</u> \$ 0.00		Resti \$	tution	
		nination of re		deferred unti	il	An Amend	ed Judgment in	a Criminal C	ase (AO 245C)) will be entered
	The defend	dant must ma	ke restitutio	on (including	g community	restitution)	to the following	payees in the a	mount listed b	elow.
	If the defer the priority before the	ndant makes y order or pe United State	a partial pay reentage pa s is paid.	yment, each yment colun	payee shall in below. T	receive an ap lowever, pui	pproximately pro suant to 18 U.S.	portioned paym C. § 3664(i): al	nent, unless spe l nonfederal vi	ecified otherwise in ctims must be paid
<u>Nam</u>	e of Paye					<u>Total I</u>	Loss* Res	titution Order	ed Priority of	or Percentage
								の 支援 [*] 等でから 2 1 (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4		
			1 550 80.00 m/s 5 50 50 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1							A STATE OF THE STA
тот	TALS .		\$	····	0.00	\$		0.00		
	Restitutio	on a mo unt or	dered pursu	ant to plea a	greement \$					
	fifteenth	ndant must pa day after the es for deling	date of the	judgment, pi	ursuant to 18	3 U.S.C. § 30	\$2,500, unless the state of the (g).	ne restitution or e payment optic	fine is paid in ons on Sheet 6	full before the may be subject
	The cour	determined	that the def	endant does	not have the	ability to pa	ay interest and it	is ordered that:		
	the in	nterest requir	ement is wa	nived for the	☐ fine	resti	tution.			
	the in	nterest requir	ement for the	ne [] fi	ine 🔲 r	estitution is:	modified as follo	ws:		

^{*} Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

Judgment --- Page 10

DEFENDANT: Pablo Nieto-Cruz CASE NUMBER: DUTX1:08CR000142

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Hav	ing a	issessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties are due as follows:
\mathbf{A}	V	Lump sum payment of \$ 200.00 due immediately, balance due
		☐ not later than, or ☐ in accordance ☐ C, ☐ D, ☐ E, or ☐ F below; or
В		Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with C, D, or F below); or
C		Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or
D.	□	Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or
E		Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or
F	\checkmark	Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:
		Special Assessment Fee of \$200 is due immediately.
Unl imp Res	ess th rison ponsi	ne court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during ment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial ibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.
The	defe	ndant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.
		nt and Several
		endant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, corresponding payee, if appropriate.
	The	e defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
	The	e defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):
	The	defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest. (6) community restitution, (7) penaltics, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

Sally B. McMinimee (5316) sbm@princeyeats.com
Jared N. Parrish (11743) jnp@princeyeates.com
Jennifer R. Korb (9147) jrk@princeyeates.com
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 524-1000

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

Attorneys for Receiver

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

VESCOR CAPITAL CORP., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER APPROVING
VERIFIED MOTION TO
CONTINUE APPOINTMENT OF
GIL A. MILLER AND HIS
COLLEAGUES NOW DOING
BUSINESS AS ROCKY
MOUNTAIN ADVISORY

Case No. 1:08cv00012 Judge: Dee Benson

Having reviewed the Verified Motion to Continue Appointment of Gil A. Miller and His Colleagues Now Doing Business as Rocky Mountain Advisory filed by Robert G. Wing, Receiver, and good cause otherwise appearing, it is, hereby,

ORDERERD that Gil A. Miller and his colleagues, formerly of PricewaterhouseCoopers, continue their role as accountants to the Receiver through their new company, Rocky Mountain Advisory.

DATED this 17 day of lay, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern Division	Distr	ietof		Utah	
UNITED STATES OF AMI	200 MAY THE ST ERICA PROTEST OF UTAH	JUDGMENT	IN A CRIMIN	AL CASE	
Pablo Nieto-Cruz	DY MESS	Case Number:	DUTX1:09CR00	00098-001	
	BENGAL Grant	USM Number:	16048-081		
		Spencer Rice,	Esq.		
THE DEFENDANT:		Defendant's Attorney			
	dicitment				
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)					
which was accepted by the court.					
was found guilty on count(s)					Witness to the Warrant of the Warran
after a plea of not guilty.					
The defendant is adjudicated guilty of the	ese offenses:				
The defendant is sentenced as prothe Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The defendant has been found not gui		<u>9</u> of th	nis judgment. The s	sentence is impose	ed pursuant to
Count(s)	☐ is ☐ are	e dismissed on the	e motion of the Unit	ted States.	
It is ordered that the defendant n or mailing address until all fines, restitution the defendant must notify the court and U	nust notify the United States on, costs, and special assessing United States attorney of man	attorney for this disents imposed by the terial changes in economic of the second seco	Judament Park		
		5-14-21	010		

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DEFENDANT: Pablo Nieto-Cruz

CASE NUMBER: DUTX1:09CR000098-001

IMPRISONMENT
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:
8 months (this term to run consecutively with sentence imposed in case #1:08-cr-142DS, District of Utah).
The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
The court recommends defendant be placed in a facility in the state of Arizona.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:
at a.m.
as notified by the United States Marshal.
The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:
before 2 p.m. on .
as notified by the United States Marshal.
as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.
as notified by the Probation of Premar Services Office.
RETURN
I have executed this judgment as follows:
Defendant delivered onto
at, w ith a certified copy of this judgment.
, and control of property of the state of th
UNITED STATES MARSHAL
By
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEFENDANT: Pablo Nieto-Cruz

CASE NUMBER: DUTX1:09CR000098-001

Judgment—Page 3 of 9

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of:

none

The defendant must report to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall register with the state sex offender registration agency in the state where the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (Check, if applicable.)

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional conditions on the attached page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- 2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- 3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;
- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- 5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons:
- 6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment;
- 7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- 8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;
- 9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- 10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- 11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- 12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and
- as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

Sheet 5 — Criminal Monetary Penalties

DEFENDANT: Pablo Nieto-Cruz

CASE NUMBER: DUTX1:09CR000098-001

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

Judgment - Page

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9

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

TOTALS	Assessment \$ 100.00		Fine \$ 0.00		estitution .00	
	rmination of restitution h determination.	is deferred until	An Amended J	udgment in a Crimina	d Case (AO 245C)	will be entered
☐ The defe	endant must make restitu	ntion (including commun	nity restitution) to th	ne following payees in t	he amount listed be	low.
If the detailed the prior before the	fendant makes a partial ity order or percentage to United States is paid.	payment, each payee sha payment column below.	all receive an approx. However, pursuan	cimately proportioned p t to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i	ayment, unless spec), all nonfederal vic	cified otherwise in tims must be paid
Name of Pay	<mark>ree</mark> Men 1945 - Natons on August	- 1. 0: - 1 1. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	<u>Total Loss*</u>	Restitution Or	dered Priority of	r Percentage
						的位表 1987年 1988年
TOTALS	\$_	0.0	0 \$	0.00		
Restitut	ion amount ordered pur	suant to plea agreement	\$			
fifteentl	n day after the date of th	t on restitution and a fingle judgment, pursuant to default, pursuant to 18	18 U.S.C. § 3612(f			
The cou	art determined that the d	efendant does not have	the ability to pay int	erest and it is ordered t	hat:	
the	interest requirement is	waived for the fi	ine restitution			
the	interest requirement for	rthe fine	restitution is modi	fied as follows:		

^{*} Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

DEFENDANT: Pablo Nieto-Cruz

CASE NUMBER: DUTX1:09CR000098-001

Judgment — Page

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

A	J.	Lump sum payment of \$ 100.00 due immediately, balance due
		not later than, or in accordance C, D, E. or F below; or
В		Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with C, D, or F below); or
C		Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or
D		Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or
E		Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within
F	V	Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:
		Special Assessment Fee of \$100 is due immediately.
		ne court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during ment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Bureau, are made to the clerk of the court. Indant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.
	Joir	nt and Several
		endant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, corresponding payee, if appropriate.
	The	e defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
	The	defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):
	The	defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:
Pay: (5) 1	ments fine in	s shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, nterest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

Pages 6 - 9
are the
Statement of Reasons,
which will be docketed
separately as a sealed
document

Prepared and proposed by: David W. Zimmerman (5567) Rebecca A. Ryon (11761) HOLLAND & HART LLP 222 South Main, Suite 2200 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Telephone: (801) 799-5800

Fax: (801) 799-5700

Email: dzimmerman@hollandhart.com raryon@hollandhart.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff Ruby Pipeline, LLC

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

MAY 1 7 2010

D. MARK JONES, CLERK

DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION

RUBY PIPELINE, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

VS.

1.648 ACRES OF REAL PROPERTY
IN BOX ELDER COUNTY, UTAH;
4.673 ACRES OF REAL PROPERTY
IN BOX ELDER COUNTY, UTAH;
1.616 ACRES OF REAL PROPERTY
IN BOX ELDER COUNTY, UTAH;
GEORGE J. MANSFELD;
LINDA MANSFELD;
LINDA MANSFELD; PRINCE
ESTALILLA; NISHA ESTALILLA;
HERMOGENES PASTOR;
ZENAIDA PASTOR; and
ADDITIONAL UNKNOWN
INTEREST OWNERS,

Defendants.

ORDER FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF LAURENCE E. GARRETT AS COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF RUBY PIPELINE, LLC

Case No. 1:10-cv-00072

Judge Dee Benson

It appearing to the Court that Petitioner meets the pro hac vice admission requirements of Local Rule 83-1.1(d), the motion for the admission pro hac vice of Laurence E. Garrett as counsel for Plaintiff Ruby Pipeline, LLC in the United States District Court, Northern District of Utah in the subject case is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: this Aday of May, 2010.

Dee Benson Honorable Dee Benson U.S. District Court Judge

4819161_1.DOC

United States Probation Office for the District of Utah

Report on Offender Under Supervision

Name of Offender: Rodney Weston Smith Docket Number: 2:03-CRt00827-001-DB Name of Sentencing Judicial Officer: Honorable Dee Benson **U.S. District Judge** Date of Original Sentence: February 23, 2005 Original Offense: Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Convicted Felon Original Sentence: 60 Months BOP Custody/36 Months Supervised Release Date of Violation Sentence: February 26, 2010 Violation Sentence: No BOP custody/continue on Supervised Release Type of Supervision: Supervised Release Current Supervision Began: December 3, 2009 SUPERVISION SUMMARY On May 6, 2010, the defendant failed to submit to a random drug test. On May 13, 2010, the defendant reported in person and admitted to United States Probation that relapsed using methamphetamine and marijuana. The defendant reported that he last used these substances on May 11, 2010. As a result of his drug use, the defendant has been referred for a substance abuse evaluation, his drug testing frequency has been increased, and he was warned that any further drug use would result in violation proceedings. In an attempt to provide the defendant with every opportunity to be successful on supervision, it is respectfully recommended that no further action be taken by the Court. If the Court desires more information or another course of action, please contact me at 801-535-2748. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Jerry Hawk U.S. Probation Officer Date: May 13, 2010 THE COURT: Approves the request noted above Denies the request noted above Tee Benson Other

Honorable Dee Benson U.S. District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTED U.S. FOR FRIDE COURT

District of Utah

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA JASON SAMUEL ANDERSEN

Judgment in a Criminal Case 2: 68 (For Revocation of Probation or Supervised Release)

Case No. DUTX205CR000073-005-TS

		USM No. 12429-081
		Parker Douglas
THE DEFENDANT:		Defendant's Attorney
admitted guilt to vio	lation of condition(s)	Allegation 4 of the Petition of the term of supervision.
☐ was found in violation	on of condition(s)	after denial of guilt.
The defendant is adjudic	ated guilty of these vio	olations:
Violation Number	Nature of Violation	n <u>Violation Ended</u>
4	Defendant has fa	failed to work regularly at a lawful occupation
	since 11/12/200	
	AND THE STATE OF T	
The defendant is sthe Sentencing Reform A		in pages 2 through of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to
The defendant has no	ot violated condition(s)	s) 1-3 of Petition and is discharged as to such violation(s) condition.
It is ordered that change of name, resident fully paid. If ordered to economic circumstances.	t the defendant must not not the defendant must not compared to mailing address upay restitution, the defendant	notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in
Last Four Digits of Defe	endant's Soc. Sec. No.	Date of Imposition of Judgment
Defendant's Year of Birt	h: <u>1973</u>	Disce of the position of studgment
City and State of Defend South Salt Lake city, U	ant's Residence: JT	Signature of Judge
		The Hoperable Ted Stewart U. S. District Judge
		Name and Title of Judge
		05/14/2010
		Date

2 Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: JASON SAMUEL ANDERSEN CASE NUMBER: DUTX205CR000073-005-TS

IMPRISONMENT

The	defendant is hereby	committed to the ci	ustody of the U	Jnited States	Bureau of P	risons to be in	nprisoned fo	r a total
total term o	f:							

13 months ☐ The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons: The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal. ☐ The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district: _____ □ a.m. □ p.m. as notified by the United States Marshal. ☐ The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons: □ before 2 p.m. on _____ ☐ as notified by the United States Marshal. □ as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office. RETURN I have executed this judgment as follows: Defendant delivered on with a certified copy of this judgment.

	UNITED STATES MARSHAL	
D		

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

AO 245D

Judgment—Page 3 of 4

DEFENDANT: JASON SAMUEL ANDERSEN CASE NUMBER: DUTX205CR000073-005-TS

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of:

NONE

The defendant must report to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter as determined by the court.

- The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check, if applicable.)
- ☐ The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon. (Check, if
- ☐ The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)
- The defendant shall register with the state sex offender registration agency in the state where the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)
- ☐ The defendant shall participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (Check, if applicable.)

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is be a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional conditions on the attached page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- 2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;
- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- 5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons;
- 6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment;
- 7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- 8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;
- 9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and
- as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

AO 245D (Rev. 12/07) Judgment in a Criminal Case for Revocations Sheet 5A — Criminal Monetary Penalties

Judgment—Page 4 of 4

DEFENDANT: JASON SAMUEL ANDERSEN CASE NUMBER: DUTX205CR000073-005-TS

ADDITIONAL TERMS FOR CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The Restitution imposed joint and several for the original sentence is reinstated.

HA PARED COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

200 MM 17 A 10:05

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

2000 III SAA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFERY W. BITTON,

Defendant.

ORDER

Case No. 2:05-cr-661 CW

Judge Clark Waddoups

The government and Defendant Jeffery W. Bitton have filed motions pertaining to discovery, Daubert hearings, and motions in limine. Because the defendant has been determined incompetent to stand trial at this time, the court dismisses without prejudice the following motions:

- 1. Motion for Daubert Hearing (Docket No. 20).
- 2. Motion in Limine (Docket No. 21).
- 3. Motion for Release of Brady Materials (Docket No. 22).
- 4. Motion for Release of Kyles Information and Brady Materials (Docket No. 23).
- 5. Motion in Limine (Docket No. 173).
- 6. Motion in Limine and Request for Daubert Hearing (Docket No. 252).

If any of the above motions become relevant in the future, the motion may be re-filed at that time.

SO ORDERED this /// May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Clark Waddoups

United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

NGOK GLOBAL CONSULTANTS, INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

PARKER INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah corporation,

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATED MOTION FOR ADR

Case No. 2:05cv372

District Judge Dee Benson

Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner by District Judge Dee Benson pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Based on the stipulated motion filed by NGOK Global Consultants, Inc. and Parker International, Inc., the above-entitled matter is hereby referred to court-annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Program for **MEDIATION**.

Accordingly, further proceedings in this matter will be governed by the provisions of DUCivR 16-2 and the court's ADR Plan.

IT IS SO REFERRED, this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

PAUL M. WARNER

United States Magistrate Judge

¹ See docket nos. 32, 38, and 64.

Todd E. Zenger (5238)
Dax D. Anderson (10168)
KIRTON & MCCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328, 3600

Telephone: (801) 328-3600 Facsimile: (801) 321-4893 Email: tzenger@kmclaw.com Email: danderson@kmclaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

MAY 1 7 2010

D. MARK JONES, CLERK

BY

DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

NGOK GLOBAL CONSULTANTS, INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff.

VS.

PARKER INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah corporation,

Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 2:05 CV 00372

Judge Dee Benson

ORDER

(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED)

Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner

NGOK, Global Consultants, Inc., ("NGOK") and Parker International, Inc. ("Parker") appeared for a hearing on Parker's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 67) on Friday April 2, 2010. NGOK was represented at the hearing by Todd E. Zenger and Dax D. Anderson. Parker was represented by Reid W. Lambert and Anthony M. Grover.

Upon consideration of the evidence, the parties' briefs, and the argument of counsel, and for the reasons set forth in the transcript of the April 2, 2010, hearing on Parker's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 67), the Court hereby orders as follows:

1. Parker's Motion for Summary Judgment against NGOK (Doc. # 67) is denied. DATED this ______ day of May, 2010.

By:

Hon. Judge Dee Benson

U.S. District Court Judge for District of Utah

Dee Benson

Approved As to Form:

WOODBURY & KESLER

By: s/Anthony M. Grover

Reid W. Lambert Anthony M. Grover

(Signed by filing attorney with permission of Anthony M. Grover via email of 5/14/10.)

Attorneys for Defendant Parker International, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

WILLIAM CHASE WOOD, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

ORDER

VS.

WORLD WIDE ASSOCIATION OF SPECIALTY PROGRAMS AND SCHOOLS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:06-CV-708 CW

Now before the court is Plaintiffs' motion to extend the deadlines for Plaintiffs to respond to various motions by various Defendants (Dkt. No. 382). That motion is GRANTED in part, as discussed below.

While the court has not yet decided whether to designate the case as complex, if it were to do so, it would likely issue an order establishing briefing deadlines different from those currently in effect. Accordingly, until the court rules upon Plaintiffs' motion to designate the case as complex, the Plaintiffs are not required to file any responsive memoranda to any outstanding motions. When the court issues an order granting or denying the designation motion, it will contemporaneously set new deadlines by which Plaintiffs are required to respond to all outstanding motions. Note, however, that all other deadlines in the federal and local rules of civil procedure must be observed by all parties.

The motion is DENIED in that the court declines to reset the hearing on Plaintiffs'

designation motion from June 23, 2010 to a later date. In conjunction with that hearing, which shall go forward on June 23, 2010, Plaintiffs shall submit to the court a brief detailing what special procedures they believe would help the court to manage this case by June 14, 2010. Possible issues the court anticipates that Plaintiffs might address in this brief include the possibility of holding more than one hearing on the outstanding dispositive motions, depending on the proposed ground for dismissal. Any response or objections to Plaintiffs' brief shall be due by June 21, 2010, though Defendants are not required to respond.

SO ORDERED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Clark Waddoups

United States District Judge

Clark Traddenps

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2000 MAY 17 P 2:38

MAY 17 2010

OFFICE OF DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISIONUDGE TENA CAMPBELL

CLOSE TO MY HEART, INC., a Utah corporation, CABIN CREEK, LLC, dba CTMH Co., a Utah limited liability company, and JRL PUBLICATIONS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ENTHUSIAST MEDIA LLC, a Delaware entity, aka CREATING KEEPSAKES, and aka WWW.CREATINGKEEPSAKES.COM,

Defendants.

Civil No.: 2:07-CV-50 TC

Judge Tena Campbell

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

By stipulation of the parties, and for good cause shown:

IT IS ORDERED:

The Motion to dismiss is GRANTED. All claims of the parties are dismissed without prejudice. Each party is to bear to its own fees and costs.

Dated this Z day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT

By:

JUDGE TENA CAMPBELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Harry File agurt

L. Rich Humpherys, 1582 CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 15 West South Temple, Suite 800 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Telephone: (801) 323.5000

Facsimile: (801) 355.3472

Attorneys for Defendants Jacob and Joan Stevens

RECEIVED

OFFICE OF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE BRUCE S. JENKINS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANY

Plaintiff,

VS.

JACOB STEVENS AND JOAN STEVENS

Defendants.

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE REPLY MEMORANDUM TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No. 2:07cv00430

Judge Bruce S. Jenkins

Pursuant to the Stipulation and Motion of the parties, defendants are granted an extension of time to and including May 21, 2010, to file their reply memorandum to plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment.

DATED this $\mathbf{\Psi}$ day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Bruce S. Jenkins

United States District Judge

Aric Cramer (#5460) CRAMER LATHAM, LLC 150 North 200 East Suite 101 St. George, Utah 84770 Telephone (435) 627-1565 Facsimile (435) 628-9876

Attorney for Defendant



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	ORDER CONTINUING SENTENCING		
Plaintiff,			
vs			
TONYA BARNEY,	CASE NUMBER 2:08-cr-140		
Defendant.	Judge Clark Waddoups		

THIS COURT having reviewed the Stipulated Motion to Continue Sentencing and good cause appearing, hereby ORDERS:

That the sentencing scheduled for May 17, 2010 at 3:00 pm is hereby stricken and reset for

(6/10/10 at 3:00 pm

DATED this 12th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Judge Clark Waddoups U.S. District Court Judge

U.S. CESTSEE COURT

200 MAY IT A II: 55

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SY' REPORT SEESIN

GARY E. DOCTORMAN (0895)
J. MICHAEL BAILEY (4965)
NICOLE PYNE (11135)
SUSAN BAIRD MOTSCHIEDLER (10653)
Parsons Behle & Latimer
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201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
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smotschiedler@parsonsbehle.com

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

ACE INVESTORS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

VS.

MARGERY RUBIN, AS TRUSTEE OF THE RUBIN FAMILY IRREVOCABLE STOCK TRUST,

Defendant.

ORDER, FINAL JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL OF COUNTERCLAIMS, THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS, AND CROSS-CLAIMS

Case No. 2:08-cv-289 TS

Judge Ted Stewart

MARGERY RUBIN, AS TRUSTEE OF THE RUBIN FAMILY IRREVOCABLE STOCK TRUST,

Third-Party Plaintiff,

VS.

CHRISTIAN YOUNG, DEAN ALLARA, BRANSON HAMILTON, MARIA SONNER, AND THOMAS SULLIVAN,

Third-Party Defendants.

CHRISTIAN YOUNG, DEAN ALLARA, AND BRANSON HAMILTON,

Cross-Claim Plaintiffs,

VS.

MARIA SONNER AND THOMAS SULLIVAN,

Cross-Claim Defendants.

Based on Plaintiff ACE Investors LLC's ("ACE Investors"), Defendant Margery Rubin, as trustee for the Rubin Family Irrevocable Stock Trust's (the "Trust"), and Cross-Claim Plaintiffs Christian Young, Dean Allara, and Branson Hamilton's ("Cross-Claim Plaintiffs") Stipulation to Entry of Judgment and Dismissal of Counterclaims, Third-Party Claims, and Cross-Claims and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

- 1. Plaintiff's claims described in its Complaint are resolved by a final judgment which is hereby entered in favor of ACE Investors and against the Trust on Plaintiff's Complaint in the principal amount of \$1,174,426.46 as of December 1, 2007, together with accrued but unpaid interest on the sum of the foregoing at the rate of 12% per annum compounded from December 1, 2007 to May 1, 2010, which amount is \$392,805.94, with interest accruing until paid, together with pre-judgment attorney fees and costs of \$164,418.97, as of March 31, 2010, fees for April, 2010, and attorneys fees to collect the judgment.
- 2. All counterclaims, third-party claims, cross claims, and any other claims described in the Trust's Amended Answer, Counterclaim, Third-Party Complaint, and Demand for Jury Trial are dismissed with prejudice.
 - 3. This is the final Order in this case.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT

Honorable Ted Stewart

Approved as to form and content the foregoing (Proposed) Order, Final Judgment and Dismissal of Counterclaims, Third-Party Claims, and Cross-Claims:

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Name:							
Attorneys	for	Margery	Rubin,	as	Trustee	of	the
Rubin Fan	nily l	[rrevocab]	e Stock	Tru	st		

U.S. - FILED COURT

200 MAY 17 A 10: 05

DISTANCE OF GAR

James E. Magleby (7247)

magleby@mgpclaw.com

Jason A. McNeill (9711)

mcneill@mgpclaw.com

MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.

170 South Main Street, Suite 350

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3605

Telephone: 801.359.9000 Facsimile: 801.359.9011

Attorneys for Defendant Codale Electric Supply, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

MP NEXLEVEL, LLC, a Minnesota limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

v.

CODALE ELECTRIC SUPPLY, INC., a Utah corporation, and YUCCA TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, INC., a New Mexico corporation, FURUKAWA ELECTRIC NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation, and SUPERIOR ESSEX, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME FOR CODALE TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Civil No. 08-CV-00727

Honorable Clark Waddoups

Based upon the stipulation of Defendant Codale Electric Supply, Inc. ("Codale") and Plaintiff MP Nexlevel, LLC ("MP"), and for good cause appearing, it is hereby **ORDERED** that Codale is granted an extension of time until Tuesday, May 18, 2010 to respond to Plaintiff's

Complaint.

DATED this day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Clark Waddoups

United States District Court

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

CLARA PALACIOS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:08-CV-755-CW-SA

V.

SURE SYSTEMS, LLC, MARCELO A. OCCON, PRO TOUCH BUILDING MAINTENANCE LLC, WALACE P. NUNES, and MAURICIO NASCIMENTO,

Defendants.

ORDER RE. MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE SERVICE

Before the court is Plaintiff Clara Palacios's Motion for Alternative Service. (Doc. 63.) In her motion, Plaintiff explains that she has just recently obtained the last known contact information for Defendant Mauricio Nascimento, who is currently residing in Brazil. (Doc. 64.) Plaintiff requests that, because Defendant Nascimento is out of the country and therefore cannot be served by traditional means, the Court allow Plaintiff to serve Defendant Nascimento by sending a copy of the summons and complaint and the Court's order on this motion to Defendant Nascimento at his address in Brazil by certified mail and by email, by sending a notice to his last known congregation, and by placing a notice in a Brazilian newspaper of general

circulation for four consecutive weekends. Plaintiff also requests that the court retroactively extend the time during which service can be effected and allow Plaintiff more time to be allowed to serve Defendant Nascimento through alternative means.

In relevant part, Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual . . . may be served at a place not within any judicial district of the United States:

- (1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;
- (2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give notice:
 - (A) as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;
 - (B) as the foreign authority
 directs in response to a letter
 rogatory or letter of request; or
 (C) unless prohibited by the
 foreign country's law, by:
 - (i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;
 - (ii) using any form of mail
 that the clerk addresses and
 sends to the individual and
 that requires a signed
 receipt; or
 - (3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).

In order to be certain that service of Defendant Nascimento is effectuated according to the requirements of the above-quoted rule, the court must first determine whether there exists an internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, that governs service of Defendant Nascimento in this case. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff inform the court by June 1, 2010, whether an agreed means of service, as set forth in Rule 4(f)(1) (quoted above) exists that governs service of Defendant Nascimento in this case.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion requesting an extension of time to serve Defendant Nascimento, which is part of Plaintiff's Motion for Alternative Service (Doc. 63) be GRANTED. The time during which Plaintiff can effectuate service on Defendant Nascimento is hereby retroactively extended and Plaintiff is granted 120 additional days, from the date of this order, to serve Defendant Nascimento.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

SAMUEL ALBA

United States Magistrate Judge

Land Alla

WILLIAM H. CHRISTENSEN (4810)
LISA C. RICO (8901)
LARSEN CHRISTENSEN & RICO, PLLC
50 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 364-6500
wchristensen@larsenrico.com



Attorneys for Defendants Canyon View Title Insurance Agency, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER A. RUSSELL, an individual.

Plaintiff,

VS.

CANYON VIEW TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah corporation,

Defendant.

2:08cv-808 TS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR CANYON VIEW TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.

Judge Ted Stewart

Based on the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Canyon View Title Insurance Agency, Inc., filed with the consent of Canyon View Title Insurance Agency, Inc., and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

- The Motion is GRANTED.
- 2. Canyon View Title shall make an appearance in this action through newly appointed counsel by no later than twenty (20) days after the date this Order is entered.

DATED this 12 day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Ted Stewart Samuel Alba

United States District Judge Magistrate

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDonough

/s/ Vincent C. Rampton

Vincent C. Rampton Attorneys for Henry Barlow

United States District Court

DISTRICT OF UTAH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

ORDER OF DISCHARGE AND DISMISSAL

LUKE PAULSEN

CASE NUMBER: 2:09-CR-00226-001

WHEREAS, the above-named defendant having previously been placed on probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3607 for a period not exceeding one year, and the Court having determined that said defendant has completed the period of probation without violation,

IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a), the Court, without entry of judgment, hereby discharges the defendant from probation and dismisses those proceedings for which probation had been ordered.

Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite United States Magistrate Judge

Date

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

DOUGLAS D. TERRY (4158) RYAN D. STOUT (10300)

Douglas D. Terry & Associates PC Attorneys for Defendant 150 North 200 East, Suite 202 St. George, Utah 84770 Telephone: (435)628-4411 MAY 1 7 2010 D. MARK JOHES, CLERK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
DISTRICT OF U	ТАН, С	CENTRAL DIVISION	_
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	ORDER	
Plaintiff,)	ORDER	
VS.)		
FILIPE JESUS MENDOZA-SORZANO,)	Case No. 2:09-cr-00315-DAK-1	
Defendant.)	Judge Robert Braithwaite	

Upon Stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT counsel for Defendant be granted an extension of time in which to file an objection to Judge Braithwaite's "Report and Recommendations", from May 14, 2010, to May 28, 2010.

DATED this _____ day of May, 2010.

District Court Judge
Magistrate

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

Case No. 2:08-cr-480 CW

Defendant.

Defendant Michael Lee Griffin has been charged with unlawful possession of a firearm. He moves to suppress evidence and statements obtained by the government on June 9, 2009 through a confession in a public parking lot before being read his *Miranda* rights, a search of his home, and confession he made after being read a *Miranda* warning.

Mr. Griffin asserts that the government violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches. Specifically, he contends that (1) the police obtained his confession in the parking lot in violation of *Miranda*,; (2) the police searched his house without his consent, and; (3) the confession he gave after he was read his *Miranda* rights was tainted by the police's earlier violations.

Because the court finds for the reasons below that Mr. Griffin voluntarily confessed, voluntarily consented to the search of his home, and waived his *Miranda* rights after being read them, the court DENIES his motion to suppress.

BACKGROUND

On June 4, 2009, West Valley City Police received information that Mr. Griffin was in possession of stolen firearms. Mr. Griffin was known by the police to be a convicted felon.

Police began to watch Mr. Griffin's home. At about 8:35 p.m., police saw Mr. Griffin leave his residence in a car. Mr. Giffin was seated in the front seat as his step father, Dale Baumgaerelt, drove. Mr. Griffin's girlfriend was seated in the rear passenger-side of the car.

Two unmarked police cars, one driven by Detective John Lefavor, followed Mr. Baumgaerelt's car. Mr. Baumgaerelt then turned into the parking lot of a grocery store and pulled into a parking stall. Both unmarked police cars parked behind Mr. Baumgaerelt's car, impeding it from leaving. Detective Lefavor turned on his vehicle's emergency lights, but did not activate the siren.

Detective Lefavor was dressed in plain clothes, but was wearing a police-badge necklace, a holstered firearm, and a pair of handcuffs. The other officer who initially pulled his car into the parking lot was dressed similarly. Detective Lefavor got out of his car and walked up to the side of the car where Mr. Griffin was sitting. Detective Lefavor asked Mr. Griffin to step out of the vehicle. Detective Lefavor and Mr. Giffin then walked to the rear of Mr. Baumgaerelt's car to speak. Other law enforcement officers soon arrived to the parking lot but did not participate in the conversation. There were also members of the public in the parking lot at the time.

Detective Lefavor began the conversation by telling Mr. Griffin that police had information that Mr. Griffin had firearms and that police wanted to recover the guns. In response, Mr. Griffin stated that he had the guns and that he was willing to go to his house and give the guns to police. Detective Lefavor explained to Mr. Griffin that per police department policy he was going to place Mr. Griffin in handcuffs in order to transport him. Mr. Griffin was handcuffed and placed in the front seat of Detective Lefavor's unmarked police car.

It was a short drive between the parking lot and Mr. Griffin's home, so the drive took only a few minutes. On the way to Mr. Griffin's residence, Mr. Griffin told Detective Lefavor

that he was concerned about his mother finding out about the guns. Mr. Griffin asked Detective Lefavor if he could retrieve the guns from the home and bring them out to police. Detective Lefavor conveyed Mr. Griffin's request to the police sergeant, but the police sergeant instructed Detective Lefavor to deny the request.

When Detective Lefavor and Mr. Griffin arrived at Mr. Griffin's home, there were a number of police officers already there. Detective Lefavor followed Mr. Griffin through an open door into the home. Once inside, Mr. Griffin indicated that the guns were underneath a blanket behind the couch. Police looked behind the couch and found three rifles.

Detective Lefavor then drove Mr. Griffin to the police station to interview him. Detective Lefavor began the interview by obtaining Mr. Griffin's personal information. Detective Lefavor then read Mr. Griffin his rights from a written *Miranda* card. Mr. Griffin stated that he understood his rights and that he was willing to answer questions. Mr. Griffin made incriminating statements during the interview. Mr. Griffin remained cooperative throughout the investigation.

ANALYSIS

Mr. Griffin moves to suppress all evidence against him related to his admission in the parking lot, the search of his house, and his confession at the interview. He raises three grounds. First, he asserts that his admission in the parking lot was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights as described in *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 435 (1966). He contends that he was in custody at the time he made the initial incriminating statement and that the statement was the result of an interrogation. Second, Mr. Griffin maintains that the search and seizure of the firearms was unlawful because his consent was not voluntary. Finally, he argues that his post-*Miranda* confession is inadmissible because it was tainted by the earlier violations.

I. Pre-Miranda Confession

Statements made during custodial interrogation are not admissible at trial against a defendant unless the defendant was notified of his *Miranda* rights. *See Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 444. The *Miranda* decision applies to "statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation." *Id.* at 439. Accordingly, there are two questions the court must answer to determine whether a *Miranda* warning was necessary: was Mr. Griffin in custody, and did Detective Lefavor's statements meet the legal definition of an interrogation? *See United States v. Revels*, 510 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2007). If the answer is yes to these questions, then a defendant's statements in the absence of the warning are not admissible. *See id.*

On the first question, the court finds that Mr. Griffin was in custody at the time of his initial confession. To determine whether a suspect was in custody, courts consider whether "a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his situation . . . as the functional equivalent of formal arrest." *U.S. v. Erving L.*, 147 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998). It is a "fact intensive" inquiry, taking into account the "totality of the circumstances." *United States v. Griffin*, 7 F.3d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1993). Several factors are considered when making this determination, including "the extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the interview at will," the "nature of the questioning," whether "prolonged accusatory questioning is likely to create a coercive environment from which an individual would not feel free to leave," and "whether police dominate the encounter." *United States v. Jones*, 523 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Griffin*, 7 F.3d at 1518).

Here, considering the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Griffin was in custody at the time he made his initial confession. First, two police cars blocked in the car in which Mr. Griffin was driving, indicating that the car was not free to leave. Next, Detective Lefavor directed Mr.

Griffin to step out of the car, with another officer in sight. Finally, Mr. Griffin and Detective

Lefavor walked to the back of the car, and other officers began to arrive. A reasonable person in

Mr. Griffin's position would have understood himself to be in custody at that point.

The question then becomes whether Detective Lefavor interrogated Mr. Griffin. First, Detective Lefavor's statements are not an interrogation merely because they were made while Mr. Griffin was in custody. *See Rhode Island v. Innis*, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980). For *Miranda* purposes, interrogation "refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." *Id.* at 301. To decide whether Detective Lefavor's statement was the functional equivalent of an interrogation, the court makes an objective assessment of whether a reasonable person in Mr. Griffin's position would perceive the officer's statements and actions as interrogation. *See United States v. Rambo*, 365 F.3d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 2004).

Here, Mr. Griffin asserts that Detective Lefavor's statements that police had been informed that Mr. Griffin was in possession of firearms and that police wanted to get them was the equivalent of an interrogation. Mr. Griffin contends that Detective Lefavor carefully chose his words and intended Mr. Griffin to respond in an incriminating way. As noted by the court in *Rambo*, "one of the techniques used by police during interrogation is to 'posit the guilt of the subject." *Rambo*, 365 F.3d at 909 (quoting *Innis*, 446 U.S. at 299).

The government responds that Detective Lefavor was merely informing Mr. Griffin of the reason for the encounter and that police had evidence against him, and that such statements are not an interrogation. In support, the government cites a string of cases, including *U.S. v.*McGlothen, 556 F.3d 698, 701 -702 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Moreno-Flores, 33 F.3d

1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1994); *Enoch v. Gramley*, 70 F.3d 1490, 1500 (7th Cir. 1995); *U.S. v. Payne*, 954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1992); *United States v. Lockett*, 393 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2005); *United States v. Suarez*, 162 Fed. Appx. 897, 902 (11th Cir. 2006); and *United States v. Hurst*, 228 F.3d 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2000).

The court has reviewed cases finding that interrogations had and had not occurred, and considered all of the circumstances. For the reasons discussed below, after this analysis, the court agrees with the government that Detective Lefavor's statements to Mr. Griffin before Mr. Griffin confessed were not an interrogation for *Miranda* purposes.

First, as stated by the Seventh Circuit in *Enoch*, "[b]riefly reciting to a suspect in custody the basis for holding him, without more, cannot be the functional equivalent of an interrogation." Enoch, 70 F.3d at 1500. See also United States v. Eastom, 320 Fed. Appx. 879, 885 (10th Cir. 2009) (a "police explanation of why they were in [a suspect's] home" was "alone insufficient to constitute interrogation."). In context, it is clear that Detective Lefavor's statements are reasonably understood as telling Mr. Griffin the reason for the police's actions in taking him into custody. A reasonable officer would know that most people would expect an explanation of why two unmarked police cars boxed in his or her car and told him or her to step out. Further, while it is not necessary for an officer to ask questions to meet the definition of an interrogation, see Rambo, 365 F.3d at 909, it is nonetheless important to note that Detective Lefavor made the statements as declarations, not as questions. This form of speaking lessens the impression that a reasonable officer would expect an inculpatory response. Moreover, Mr. Griffin concedes that he confessed immediately after Detective Lefavor made his statements. In sum, there is no evidence that Detective Lefavor, or a reasonable officer in his place, should have anticipated that Mr. Griffin would immediately confess in response to those statements.

The circumstances of the present case are quite unlike the interaction that the Tenth Circuit found was an interrogation in *Rambo*. In that case, a police officer was talking to a suspect who was in custody in an "interrogation room." *Rambo*, 365 F.3d at 907. The officer opened a conversation by implying that the defendant was guilty and by informing him that he was going to charge a suspected accomplice. *See id.* at 908. The officer further appeared to play on the suspect's concerns about his suspected accomplice's children. *See id.* Finally, the officer directed the suspect several times to the matter under investigation.. *See id.* Considering these key circumstances along with the overall context, the Tenth Circuit held that the officer had interrogated the suspect. *See id.* at 909-10.

The court is cognizant that an interaction need not reach the level of that described in *Rambo* to be an interrogation, and that each case must be judged on its own facts. But after considering the full context and circumstances here, the court is satisfied that this case falls in the realm of cases such as *Enoch* and *Eastom* that conclude that there was no interrogation and is distinguishable from cases such as *Rambo* that reach the opposite conclusion.

Accordingly, the court finds that Mr. Griffin made his confession voluntarily, and without interrogation by the police. Such statements are not are admissible even if no *Miranda* warning is given. *See United States v. Torres-Guevara*, 147 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Because the statement was volunteered, rather than given in response to any interrogation, this statement also was admissible in the absence of *Miranda* warnings.") (citation omitted). This conclusion is true even if the person is in custody when he or she made the statement. *See United States v. Glover*, 211 Fed. Appx. 811, 814 (10th Cir. 2007) (*Miranda* does not bar admission of voluntary statements, even if made in custody).

II. Evidence from the Search

Voluntary consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirement. *See United States v. Silva-Arzeta*, - - - F.3d - - -, 2010 WL 1662480, *3 (10th Cir. April 27, 2010). If a person voluntarily consents to a search, he or she waives of his or her Fourth Amendment rights in the item or place. *See id.* Whether a defendant voluntarily consented to a search is a question of fact, determined by the totality of the circumstances. *See id.* "Valid consent is that which is freely and voluntarily given." *United States v. Patten*, 183 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). There is no presumption that the consent was voluntary, or that it was involuntary. *United States v. Hernandez*, 93 F.3d 1493, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996). The government has the burden of proving the consent was voluntary. *See id.*

"The central question is whether a reasonable person would believe he was free to ... disregard the officer's request." *Silva-Arzeta*, 2010 WL 1662480, *4 (quoting *United States v. Ledesma*, 447 F.3d 1307, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006)). "The proper inquiry centers on whether the defendant suffered, inter alia, physical mistreatment, use of violence or threats of violence, promises or inducements, deception or trickery." *Silva-Arzeta*, 2010 WL 1662480, *4 (quoting *United States v. Dozal*, 173 F.3d 787, 796 (10th Cir. 1999)

Courts also look to factors such as 1) the youth, lack of education, or low intelligence of the defendant; 2) the lack of any advice as to the defendant's constitutional rights; 3) the length of detention; 4) the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; 5) degree to which the individual cooperates with police; and 6) the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. *See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).

In this case, Mr. Griffin offered to go to his house and turn the firearms over to police without having Detective Lefavor even asking him to do so. The interaction between Mr. Griffin

and Detective Lefavor before Mr. Griffin consented was short – almost immediately after

Detective Lefavor informed him of the reason for the stop. *See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa-Espana*, 511 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2007) (consent voluntary because defendant immediately consented after single question from law enforcement officer). Detective Lefavor did not subject Mr. Griffin to repeated or prolonged questioning or use any other coercive techniques before Mr. Griffin consented. Moreover, Mr. Griffin was cooperative with police from the initial encounter until the search was completed, and the court has no indication from the record that he is incapable of intelligently giving consent and cooperation. While it is true that there were two officers in the parking lot initially and that more arrived as the situation unfolded, Mr. Griffin gives no authority for the proposition that the mere presence of more than one officers is by itself coercive. Nor does the record reflect that any of those officers threatened, approached, or otherwise interacted with Mr. Griffin in a way that might have intimidated him. Instead, Mr. Griffin spoke to Detective Lefavor alone, who took no actions against Mr. Griffin that could reasonably be construed as coercive.

Accordingly, the court cannot find that police used any coercion in obtaining consent from Mr. Griffin. This outcome holds true even though Detective Lefavor did not tell Mr. Griffin that he could withhold consent and Mr. Griffin was in custody. *See United States v. Thompson*, 524 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir. 2008) (consent to search voluntary because consent was not coerced despite the fact officers did not inform homeowner of right to refuse) and *U.S. v. Contreras*, 506 F.3d 1031, 1037 (10th Cir. 2007) (ruling that "detention is only one factor to be considered in determining whether consent was voluntarily and freely given based on the totality of the circumstances."). Mr. Griffin's consent to the search of his home was therefore voluntary and evidence obtained during that search is admissible.

Mr. Griffin argues that he attempted to limit the scope of the search of his home by requesting that he be allowed to bring out the firearms himself. *See United States v. Sanchez*, 89 F.3d 715, 719 (10th Cir. 1996). Under the circumstances, the court cannot find that Mr. Griffin's request to get the firearms himself was a cognizable attempt to limit the scope of the search. Mr. Griffin was essentially asking police to trust him to go alone into a house where his parents and at least one sibling also lived and retrieve firearms that may have been loaded. Such a request is so inconsistent with the safety of the officers and the public that a reasonable person in Mr. Griffin's position could not have believed it would be granted. Moreover, even if this were a *bona fide* attempt by Mr. Griffin to limit the scope of consent, Mr. Griffin made no attempt to withdraw his consent when Detective Lefavor told him that he could not get the firearms himself. Instead, Mr. Griffin led police directly to the firearms very soon after having his request declined. In that scenario, Mr. Griffin voluntarily expanded the scope of consent after limiting it.

III. Post-Miranda Confession

Mr. Griffin does not deny that he waived his right to remain silent after being read his *Miranda* rights at the station. Instead, the sole basis for Mr. Griffin's argument that his post-*Miranda* confession should be suppressed is that it was tainted by earlier violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. As is clear from the above discussion, however, the court has found that no such violations occurred. Accordingly, his statements at the police interview are admissible.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Griffin's motion to suppress is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Maddingle

Clark Waddoups United States District Judge

			- M	V 1 7 2010
United	States District	District Co of Utah	urt D. Mari BY	V BL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs.		JUDGMENT IN A AS AMENDED	A CRIMIN	AL CASE
Jeffery Michael Weiland		Case Number:	2:09-	er-00597-RTB
		Plaintiff Attorney:	Paul K	ohler
		Defendant Attorney:	Ben G	ordon
Date of Imposition: April 26, 2010				
X pleaded guilty to count(s)	Count I			
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was accepted by the court.				-
was found guilty on count(s)			-	
Title & Section 18:111(a) Nature of Offer Simple Assault			The state of the s	Count <u>Number(s)</u> I
The defendant has been found not guilty on co	ount(s) count			
Count(s)		(is)(are) dismissed on th	e motion of	he United States.
Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 198 defendant be committed to the custody of the	84, it is the jud			the
Upon release from confinement, the defendant	nt shall be plac	ed on supervised relea	ise for a term	a of
The defendant is placed on Probation for a ter	rm of <u>12 m</u> o	nths supervised	•	
The defendant shall not commit another feder	ral, state or loc	al crime.	CAPP COMPANY	
The defendant shall refrain from any unlawfutest within 15 days of placement on probation				hall submit to one drug
The above drug testing condition is	-		rmination th	at the defendant

Defendant: Jeffery Michael Weiland

Case Number: 2:09-cr-00597-RTB

If this judgment imposes a fine or a restitution obligation, it shall be a condition of supervised release/probation that the defendant pay any such fine or restitution in accordance with the Schedule of Payments set forth in the Criminal Monetary Penalties section of this judgment.

The defendant shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court (set forth below). The defendant shall also comply with the additional conditions in this judgment.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE/PROBATION

- 1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- 2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the 3) probation officer;
- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, 5) training, or other acceptable reasons;
- the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment: 6)
- the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or 7) administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or 8) administered:
- 9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- 10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- 11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- 12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court;
- 13) as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE / PROBATION

In addition to all Standard Conditions of Supervised Release or Probation set forth above, the following Special

Defendant: Jeffery Michael Weiland Case Number: 2:09-cr-00597-RTB
The Defendant shall serve 75 days in the Washington County Purgatory Facility with credit for 34 days, leaving a balance of 41 days to be served with the BOP.
CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES
FINE
the defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of \$300.00 , payable as follows: forthwith.
in accordance with the Bureau of Prison's Financial Responsibility Program while incarcerated and thereafter pursuant to a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court.
in accordance with a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court.
x other: as directed by the probation department
The defendant shall pay interest on any fine more than \$2,500, unless the fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f).
The court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3), it is ordered that:
The interest requirement is waived.
The interest requirement is modified as follows:
RESTITUTION
The defendant shall make restitution to the following payees in the amounts listed below:
Name and Address of Payee Amount of Loss Amount of Loss Restitution Ordered
Totals: \$\$
(See attachment if necessary.) All restitution payments must be made through the Clerk of Court, unless directed otherwise. If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportional payment unless otherwise specified.
Restitution is payable as follows:
in accordance with a schedule established by the U.S. Probation Office, based upon the

Defendant: Case Number:		
on or after 04 pursuant to 1	ant having been convicted of an offense described in 18 U.S.C.§3663A(c) and committed 04/25/1996, determination of mandatory restitution is continued until 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)(not to exceed 90 days after sentencing). A Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case will be entered after such determination	
	SPECIAL ASSESSMENT	
The defendant shall forthwit	all pay a special assessment in the amount of \$ 25.00 , payable as follows: ith.	
x as dir	rected by the probation department	-
	PRESENTENCE REPORT / OBJECTIONS	
The court ad	adopts the factual findings and guideline application in the presentence report.	
The court ad set forth belo	adopts the factual findings and guideline application in the presentence report, except as elow:	
Guideline Range	ge Determined by the Court:	
Total Offense Lev	evel:	
	y Category:	
	lange: to months	
Supervised Relea	ease Range: to years	
Fine Range:	to	
	RECOMMENDATION	
Pursuant to 18 of Prisons:	8 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4), the Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau	
	CUSTODY/SURRENDER	
x The defendant	nt is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.	
The defendant	nt shall surrender to Washington County Correctional Facility at Purgatory at on	
The defendant Institution's lo	nt shall report to the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons by local time, on	
DATE: 5	5-17-1D RYPM	

Robert T. Braithwaite

United States District Court District of Utah

UNITED ST	ATES OF	AMERICA
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JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

(For Offenses	Committed On or	r After Novembe	r 1, 1987)

	DEPLY 1
Cooper R. Bills	Case Number: DUTX 209CR000659-001
	Plaintiff Attorney: Stanley H. Olsen
	Defendant Attorney: Daryl P. Sam
9012	Atty: CJA Ret FPD *
Last 4 - Dft's Soc. Sec. No: 8013	
Defendant's Year of Birth: 1991	5/6/2010 As Amended from 9/17/2009 Date of Imposition of Sentence
Defendant's USM No.: N/A	·
Defendant's Residence Address:	Defendant's Mailing Address:
Sandy, UT 84092 Country USA	Sandy, UT 84092 Country USA
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)	COP <u>9/17/2009</u> Verdict e Misdemeanor Information
which was accepted by the court. was found guilty on count(s)	
Title & Section Nature of Offense	Count Number(s) SESSION/ Simple Possession ance
Title & Section Nature of Offense 21 U.S.C. §844 MARIJUANA- POSS of a Controlled Substant	SESSION/ Simple Possession 1 ance
Title & Section Nature of Offense 21 U.S.C. §844 MARIJUANA- POSS of a Controlled Substantial The defendant has been found not guilty on count	SESSION/ Simple Possession 1 ance (s)
Title & Section 21 U.S.C. §844 MARIJUANA- POSS of a Controlled Substance The defendant has been found not guilty on count Count(s)	SESSION/ Simple Possession 1 ance (s)

The defendant is placed on Probation for a period of <u>12 Months from 9/17/09</u>. × The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance.

Defendant: Cooper R. Bills Case Number: 209CR000659-001

For offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994:

The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on probation and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation officer.

The above drug testing condition is suspended based on the court's determination that the defendant possesses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check if applicable.)

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE/PROBATION

In addition to all Standard Conditions of (Supervised Release or Probation) set forth in PROBATION FORM 7A, the following Special Conditions are imposed: (see attachment if necessary)

- 1. Probation under 18 U.S.C. 3607 is revoked, conviction entered. 12 Months Probation shall continue from 9/17/2009.
- 2. The Defendant shall submit to drug/ alcohol testing, as directed by the probation office, and pay a one-time \$115 fee to partially defer the costs of collection and testing. If deemed appropriate by the Court and the probation office, the defendant will pay additional costs associated with confirmation and testing of positive results reported to the Court.
- 3. All previous terms and conditions remain in effect.

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

FINE

The	def	endant shall pay a fine in the amount of \$ 1000.00 , payable as follows: forthwith.
		in accordance with the Bureau of Prison's Financial Responsibility Program while incarcerated and thereafter pursuant to a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court.
		in accordance with a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court.
	*	other: Due 9/17/2010
		e defendant shall pay interest on any fine more than \$2,500, unless the fine is paid in full before fifteenth day after the date of judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f).
		e court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and pursuant to 18 S.C. § 3612(f)(3), it is ordered that:
		The interest requirement is waived.
		The interest requirement is modified as follows:
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

RESTITUTION

The defendant shall make restitution to the following payees in the amounts listed below:

Defendant:

Cooper R. Bills

Case Number:

209CR000659-001

Page 3 of 5

Name and Address of Payee

Amount of Loss

Amount of **Restitution Ordered**

Totals: \$ \$
(See attachment if necessary.) All restitution payments must be made through the Clerk of Court, unless directed otherwise. If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportional payment unless otherwise specified.
Restitution is payable as follows:
in accordance with a schedule established by the U.S. Probation Office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court.
other:
The defendant having been convicted of an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c) and committed on or after 04/25/1996, determination of mandatory restitution is continued until pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)(not to exceed 90 days after sentencing).
An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case will be entered after such determination
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT
The defendant shall pay a special assessment in the amount of \$ 25.00 , payable as follows: [] forthwith.
Due 9/17/2010. Defendant shall also pay a \$115 drug testing fee due 9/17/2010.
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid

PRESENTENCE REPORT/OBJECTIONS

The court adopts the factual findings and guidelines application recommended in the presentence report except as otherwise stated in open court.

DEPARTURE

The Court does not grant the Motion for Departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2), the Court enters its reasons for departure:

Page 4 of 5

Defendant:

Cooper R. Bills 209CR000659-001 Case Number:

RECOMMENDATION

CUSTODY	//SURRENDER
☐ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the	he United States Marshal.
The defendant shall surrender to the United St	ates Marshal for this district at
The defendant shall report to the institution de Institution's local time, on	esignated by the Bureau of Prisons by
DATE: 5/14/2010	Robert T. Braithwaite

United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant: Cooper R. Bills
Case Number: 209CR000659-001

RETURN

I ha	we executed this judgment a	s follows:		
			-	
	Defendant delivered on		to	
at		, with a certified copy of	of this judgment.	
			UNITED STATES MARSHAL	
		Ву		
			Deputy U	.S. Marshal

United States District Court District of Utah

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

vs. John P. Maxim		(For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987) Case Number: DUTX 209CR000670-001		
		Defendant Attorney:	Pro Se	
		Atty: CJA	Ret FPD	
Last 4 - Dft's Soc. Sec. No:	7055			
Defendant's Year of Birth:	1977	5/6/2010		
Defendant's USM No.:	N/A	Date of Imposition of Sentence		
Defendant's Residence Add	iress:	Defendant's Mailing Address:		
Salt Lake City, UT 84103		Salt Lake City, UT 84103		
Country USA		Country USA		
THE DEFENDANT: pleaded guilty to c	ount(s) 1 of the 1	COP <u>5/6/2010</u> Verdict Misdemeanor Informa		
pleaded nolo conte	ed by the court.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
was found guilty o	n count(s)			
<u>Title & Section</u> 43 U.S.C. §1701	Unauthorized Disposal	ICY AND MANAGEME of Household, Commerciand Waste (43 U.S.C. 1701	al,	
The defendant has	been found not guilty on count(s)			
Count(s)		_(is)(are) dismissed on the r	motion of the United States.	
Pursuant to the S	SEN entencing Reform Act of 1984	TENCE	rder of the Court that the	
	itted to the custody of the Unit			
Upon release from o	confinement, the defendant sha	ll be placed on supervised	d release for a term of	

The defendant is placed on Probation for a period of
The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance.

Defendant: John P. Maxim Case Number: 209CR000670-001 For offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994: The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on probation and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation officer. The above drug testing condition is suspended based on the court's determination that the defendant possesses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check if applicable.) SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE/PROBATION In addition to all Standard Conditions of (Supervised Release or Probation) set forth in PROBATION FORM 7A, the following Special Conditions are imposed: (see attachment if necessary) 1. **CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES** FINE The defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of \$, payable as follows: forthwith. in accordance with the Bureau of Prison's Financial Responsibility Program while incarcerated and thereafter pursuant to a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court. in accordance with a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court. ***** other: No Fine Imposed The defendant shall pay interest on any fine more than \$2,500, unless the fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). The court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. \S 3612(f)(3), it is ordered that: The interest requirement is waived. The interest requirement is modified as follows: RESTITUTION The defendant shall make restitution to the following payees in the amounts listed below:

Amount of Loss \$600.00

Amount of **Restitution Ordered** \$600.00

Name and Address of Payee BLM- Salt Lake Field Office Attn: Ranger Randal A. Griffin 2370 South 2300 West

Salt Lake City, UT 84119

Defendant:

John P. Maxim

Page 3 of 5 Case Number: 209CR000670-001

Name and Address of Payee

of Prisons:

Amount of Loss

Amount of **Restitution Ordered**

Tots	als:	\$_600.00	\$	600.00
(See attachment if necessary.) All restitution payments otherwise. If the defendant makes a partial payment, eaunless otherwise specified.	mus ach p	t be made throu ayee shall rece	igh the Clerk cive an approxi	of Court, unless directed mately proportional payme
Restitution is payable as follows:				
in accordance with a schedule establidefendant's ability to pay and with the				based upon the
other: Due 11/10/2010				
☐ The defendant having been convicted of an or on or after 04/25/1996, determination of man pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)(not to exc ☐ An Amended Judgment in a Criminal	dator	ry restitution is 90 days after se	continued unti intencing).	il
SPECIAL	L AS	SESSMENT		
The defendant shall pay a special assessment in t forthwith.	the a	mount of \$		_, payable as follows:
▼ Waived		·		<u> </u>
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the U change of name, residence, or mailing address until all this judgment are fully paid				
PRESENTENCE	REF	ORT/OBJEC	TIONS	
The court adopts the factual findings and guide report except as otherwise stated in open court.		application rec	ommended in	the presentence
DE	PAR	TURE		
The Court grant the Motion for Departure purreasons for departure:	suant	to 18 U.S.C. 3	553(c)(2), the	Court enters its

RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4), the Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau

Page 4 of 5

Defendant:

John P. Maxim

Case Number: 209CR000670-001

CUSTODY/SURRENDER

☐ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the	United States Marshal.
The defendant shall surrender to the United State on	s Marshal for this district at
The defendant shall report to the institution designated and institution's local time, on	gnated by the Bureau of Prisons by
DATE: 5/14/2010	RTPULL
	Robert T. Braithwaite

United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant:

John P. Maxim Case Number: 209CR000670-001

RETURN

I ha	we executed this judgment a	follows:	
	Defendant delivered on	to	
at	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	_, with a certified copy of this judgment.	
		UNITED STATES MARSHAL	
		By	

United States District Court District of Utah

UNITED STATES	5 OF AMERICA	(For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987)				
VS	J.	(For Officials Committee On C	Alei November 1, 1907)			
Shane B. P	rettyman	Case Number: DUTX	209CR000796-001			
		Plaintiff Attorney:	Stanley H. Olsen			
		Defendant Attorney:	Natalie A. Benson			
		Attv: CJA	Ret FPD *			
Last 4 - Dft's Soc. Sec. No: 2	2408					
Defendant's Year of Birth: 1	1981	5/6/2010				
Defendant's USM No.: 1	17008-081	Date of Imposition of Sentence	•			
Defendant's Residence Addres	SS:	Defendant's Mailing Address:				
Sandy, UT 84093 Country USA		Sandy, UT 84093 Country USA				
THE DEFENDANT: pleaded guilty to cou	int(s) 1 of the N	COP <u>5/6/2010 </u>				
pleaded nolo contend which was accepted	dere to count(s)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
was found guilty on	•					
Title & Section 21 U.S.C. §844	Nature of Offense MARIJUANA- POSSES of a Controlled Substanc	<u>=</u>	Count Number(s) on 1			
	een found not guilty on count(s)					
Count(s)		(is)(are) dismissed on the	motion of the United States.			
	SEN	FENCE				
	ntencing Reform Act of 1984, ed to the custody of the Unite	it is the judgment and o				
Upon release from co	nfinement, the defendant shal	l be placed on supervise	ed release for a term of			
						

The defendant is placed on Probation for a period of 12 Months

The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance.

Defendant: Shane B. Prettyman Case Number: 209CR000796

For offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994:

The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on probation and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation officer.

The above drug testing condition is suspended based on the court's determination that the defendant possesses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check if applicable.)

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE/PROBATION

In addition to all Standard Conditions of (Supervised Release or Probation) set forth in PROBATION FORM 7A, the following Special Conditions are imposed: (see attachment if necessary)

- 1. Defendant is placed on 12 months probation.
- 2. Defendant shall serve 15 days jail. Defendant shall self- surrender on 5/7/2010 at 7:00 PM.
- 3. Defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on supervision and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation officer.
- 4. Defendant shall submit to the collection of a DNA sample at the direction of the Bureau of Prisons or U.S. Probation Office.
- 5. Defendant shall not commit any federal, state, or local crime and, shall be prohibited from possessing a firearm or other dangerous device while on supervision.
- 6. Defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance and shall comply with the standard conditions of supervision as adopted by this Court.
- 7. Defendant shall submit to drug/ alcohol testing as directed by the probation office and pay a one-time \$115.
- 8. Defendant shall participate in drug and/ or alcohol abuse treatment under a copayment plan as directed by the U.S. Probation Office and shall not possess or consume alcohol during the course of treatment, nor frequent businesses where alcohol is the chief item of order.
- 9. Defendant shall participate in a mental health treatment program under a copayment plan as directed by the probation office, take any mental health medications as prescribed, and not possess or consume alcohol, nor frequent businesses where alcohol is the primary item of order, during the course of treatment or medication.
- 10. Defendant shall submit his person, residence, office, or vehicle to a search, conducted by the probation office at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, based upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or evidence of a violation of a condition of release; failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation; the defendant shall warn any other residents that the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition.
- Defendant may complete Community Service hours at the approved list of locations up to 30 hours in lieu of \$300 of the fine imposed.

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

FINE

The defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of	\$ 1000.00	_ , payable as follows:
☐ forthwith.		

Defendant: Case Number:	Shane B. Prettyman 209CR000796		Page 3 of 5
an	accordance with the Bureau of Prison's F nd thereafter pursuant to a schedule establi efendant's ability to pay and with the appro	shed by the U.S. Probation	
	accordance with a schedule established by efendant's ability to pay and with the appro		ee, based upon the
≭ ot <u>D</u>		·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	efendant shall pay interest on any fine more freenth day after the date of judgment, purs		
	ourt determines that the defendant does no c. § 3612(f)(3), it is ordered that:	t have the ability to pay i	nterest and pursuant to 18
☐ TI	he interest requirement is waived.		
☐ TI	he interest requirement is modified as follo	ows:	
	RESTIT	TUTION	
The	defendant shall make restitution to the f	following payees in the a	amounts listed below:
Name an	nd Address of Payee	Amount of Loss	Amount of Restitution Ordered
	Totals:	\$	\$
	if necessary.) All restitution payments mue defendant makes a partial payment, each specified.		A CONTRACT OF THE PROPERTY OF
Restitu	ation is payable as follows:		
	in accordance with a schedule established defendant's ability to pay and with the ap-	•	iffice, based upon the
	other:		
on or a	fendant having been convicted of an offen fter 04/25/1996, determination of mandatont to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)(not to exceed An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Cast	ory restitution is continued 90 days after sentencing	d until).

Page 4 of 5

Defendant: Shane B. Prettyman Case Number: 209CR000796

SPECI	A T	ACCT		ידיותים
SPECE	\mathbf{AL}	ASSE	22IAI	LINI

The defendant shall pay a special assessment in forthwith.	the amount of \$ _25.00 , payable as fol
▼ Due 5/6/2011. Defendant shall also p	pay a \$115 drug testing fee due 5/6/2011.
	United States Attorney for this district within 30 days ll fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imp
PRESENTENCI	E REPORT/OBJECTIONS
The court adopts the factual findings and guid report except as otherwise stated in open cour	delines application recommended in the presentence
D	EPARTURE
The Court grant the Motion for Departure pureasons for departure:	ursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2), the Court enters its
RECO	OMMENDATION
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4), the Co of Prisons:	ourt makes the following recommendations to the Bure
CUSTO	DDY/SURRENDER
☐ The defendant is remanded to the custody of	of the United States Marshal.
The defendant shall surrender to the USMS 7:00 PM on 5/7/2010	S or directed jail for this district at
The defendant shall report to the institution Institution's local time,	
DATE: 5/14/2010	8 Thull
	Robert T. Braithwaite United States Magistrate Judge
	United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant: Shane B. Prettyman Case Number: 209CR000796

RETURN

I ha	ve executed this judgment as	s follows:			
	Defendant delivered on	·	to		
at _		, with a certified cop	py of this jud	gment.	
				UNITED STATES MARSHAL	
		Ву			
				Deputy U.S. Marshal	

TELED COURT

United States District Court District of Utah

200 MAY IU P 4: 30

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs.	JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE (For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987)				
vs.	TERM Y GLOWN				
Michael W. Hilton	Case Number: DUTX 209CR000797-001				
	Plaintiff Attorney: Stanley H. Olsen				
	Defendant Attorney: Natalie A. Benson				
	Atty: CJA Ret FPD *_				
Last 4 - Dft's Soc. Sec. No: 9559	· — — — ·				
Defendant's Year of Birth: 1985	5/6/2010 As Amended from 11/12/2009				
Defendant's USM No.: N/A	Date of Imposition of Sentence				
Defendant's Residence Address:	Defendant's Mailing Address:				
West Valley, UT 84120 Country USA	West Valley, UT 84120 Country USA				
THE DEFENDANT: pleaded guilty to count(s) 1 of the N	COP 11/12/2009 Verdict Misdemeanor Information				
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was accepted by the court.					
was found guilty on count(s)					
Title & Section 21 U.S.C. §844 MARIJUANA- POSSES of a Controlled Substance	Count Number(s) SION/ Simple Possession 1 e				
The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)					
Count(s)	(is)(are) dismissed on the motion of the United States.				
	(15)(are) dishinssed on the motion of the office states.				
CENT	PENICE				
	it is the judgment and order of the Court that the d States Bureau of Prisons for a term of				
Upon release from confinement, the defendant shal	l be placed on supervised release for a term of				

The defendant is placed on Probation for a period of 12 Months from 5/6/10

The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance.

Case Number: 209CR000797-001

For offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994:

The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on probation and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation officer.

The above drug testing condition is suspended based on the court's determination that the defendant possesses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check if applicable.)

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE/PROBATION

In addition to all Standard Conditions of (Supervised Release or Probation) set forth in PROBATION FORM 7A, the following Special Conditions are imposed: (see attachment if necessary)

- Probation under 18 U.S.C. 3607 is revoked, conviction entered. 12 Months Probation is 1. revoked and reinstated from 5/6/2010.
- 2. The Defendant shall submit to drug/alcohol testing, as directed by the probation office, and pay a one-time \$115 fee to partially defer the costs of collection and testing. If deemed appropriate by the Court and the probation office, the defendant will pay additional costs associated with confirmation and testing of positive results reported to the Court.
- 3. All previous terms and conditions remain in effect.

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

FINE

The	defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of \$ 1000.00 , payable as follows: or forthwith.
	in accordance with the Bureau of Prison's Financial Responsibility Program while incarcerated and thereafter pursuant to a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court.
	in accordance with a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court.
	while Under Supervision
	The defendant shall pay interest on any fine more than \$2,500, unless the fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f).
	The court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3), it is ordered that:
	☐ The interest requirement is waived.
	☐ The interest requirement is modified as follows:

RESTITUTION

The defendant shall make restitution to the following payees in the amounts listed below:

Defendant:

Michael W. Hilton

Case Number: 209CR000797-001

Na	me	and	Ad	dre	ess	of i	Pa	yee

Amount of Loss

Amount of **Restitution Ordered**

	Totals: \$	\$	
ee attachment if necessary.) All restitute herwise. If the defendant makes a part less otherwise specified.			
Restitution is payable as follow	vs:		
	chedule established by the U.S ay and with the approval of th		ed upon the
other:			
The defendant having been con on or after 04/25/1996, determing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) An Amended Judgmen	ination of mandatory restitution	on is continued until ter sentencing).	
	SPECIAL ASSESSME	NT	
The defendant shall pay a special a	assessment in the amount of \$	25.00	payable as follows:
forthwith.			

PRESENTENCE REPORT/OBJECTIONS

The court adopts the factual findings and guidelines application recommended in the presentence report except as otherwise stated in open court.

DEPARTURE

The Court grant the Motion for Departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2), the Court enters its reasons for departure:

RECOMMENDATION

Defendant: Case Number:	Michael W. Hilton 209CR000797-001	Pa	age 4 of 5
Pursua of Pris	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	t makes the following recommendations to the	Bureau
	CUSTOD	Y/SURRENDER	
☐ The de	efendant is remanded to the custody of	the United States Marshal.	
The d	efendant shall surrender to the United S	tates Marshal for this district at	
The d	efendant shall report to the institution d Institution's local time, on	lesignated by the Bureau of Prisons by	
DATE:	5/14/2010	Robert T. Braithwaite	<u> </u>
		United States Magistrate Judge	

Page 5 of 5

Defendant: Michael W. Hilton Case Number: 209CR000797-001

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:				
	Defendant delivered on		to	
at .		, with a certified copy of this judgment.		
			UNITED STATES MARSHAL	
		Ву	Deputy U.S. Marshal	

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

KEN CLARK, an individual,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

MORINDA PROPERTIES ESCALA LODGES, LC, a Utah limited liability company; U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; SILVERADO DEVELOPMENT INC. d/b/a SDI PROPERTIES; KERRY ASAY, an individual; KIM ASAY, an individual; JOHN WADSWORTH, an individual; WAYNE TURNER, an individual; DONALD E. MULLEN, an individual; EXTREME HOLDING, LLC d/b/a PRUDENTIAL UTAH REAL ESTATE, a Utah limited liability company; DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:09-CV-136-TS

I. Introduction

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Defendants Morinda Properties Escala Lodges,
LC ("Morinda"), Silverado Development, Inc., Kerry Asay, Kim Asay, John Wadsworth, and
Wayne Turner ("Defendants"), and Defendants' Motions to Strike.¹

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and grant Defendants' Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Consequently, Defendants' Motions to Strike is moot.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ken Clark brings four causes of action, two alleging breach of contract and two alleging violations of the Utah Consumer and Land Sales Practices Acts. The present Motions address only the breach of contract claims.

Both Plaintiff and Defendants move for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract, while Plaintiff also moves for U.S. Bank to be required to refund Plaintiff's deposit if he prevails on the breach of contract claim. Plaintiff argues that Defendants breached the terms of the purchase contract by failing to achieve substantial completion by September 30, 2008, while Defendants counter that substantial completion was achieved on September 16, 2008.

¹Donald E. Mullen, Extreme Holding, LLC, and U.S. Bank are the other Defendants in this case. Defendant U.S. Bank has filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment and has not joined in the Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. While Plaintiff's allegations are also against Defendants Mullen and Extreme Holding L.L.C., they are represented by other counsel and did not join in the Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or Motion to Strike.

The following facts are undisputed. In June 2005, Plaintiff signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") for the purchase of a condominium at Escala Lodges in Park City that was to be constructed by Defendant Morinda. Plaintiff deposited \$120,300 in connection with the purchase of this unit. The REPC originally stated that the condominium would be substantially completed within twenty-six months of acceptance, which was later extended another thirteen months to September 30, 2008, by a mutually-agreed-upon addendum. The REPC defined "substantial completion" in paragraph 11, which reads: "The Condominium Unit shall be considered 'Substantially Complete' when a temporary or permanent certificate of occupancy for the Condominium Unit has been issued by Summit County."

On September 16, 2008, a Summit County Building Inspector issued a document entitled "Summit County Compliance Inspection Report" that stated "TCO (Temporary C/O) approval for:" and then listed, among other units, the unit Plaintiff had contracted to purchase.³ This document also stated that the "TCO" applied only to residential rooms, was approved for a period of ninety days, and could be "revoked by Building Official or Fire Marshal for cause." It concluded by stating, "TCO Approved on Basis of Above Agreed Contingencies." This document will be referred to as "the TCO."

²Docket No. 31, Ex. A ¶ 11.

³*Id*. Ex. G.

 $^{^{4}}Id$.

⁵Id.

⁶Plaintiff and Plaintiff's witness Mr. Sargent primarily refer to this document as a "purported TCO."

After being issued this document, Defendant Morinda notified Plaintiff that it had received a temporary certificate of occupancy for the unit, that the unit was substantially complete, and that Plaintiff was required to close within fourteen days. On October 3, 2008, Plaintiff notified Morinda of its desire to terminate the REPC. Morinda responded on October 9, 2008, stating that the REPC remained enforceable and that Plaintiff was obligated to close. Morinda was issued a certificate of occupancy, the validity of which is not disputed, on December 16, 2008. The parties' dispute relates to whether Morinda achieved substantial completion before the September 30, 2008, deadline.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented. The Court is required to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there

⁷FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

⁸See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir. 1991).

⁹See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991).

is a genuine issue for trial, if he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him."¹⁰

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Motions to Strike

Defendants' Motions to Strike the original and supplemental Declarations of Mr.

Sargent¹¹ are implicated by the Court's ruling on the Cross Motions for Partial Summary

Judgment. Defendants argue that these Declarations should be stricken because they largely

consistent of "unsupported and inadmissible opinion testimony"¹² and "conclusions of law."¹³ As

is discussed below, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Response to

Defendant's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment rely heavily upon the statements made

by Mr. Sargent and striking his Declarations would cripple Plaintiff's arguments. However, even

without striking the Sargent Declarations, the undisputed evidence supports Defendants' Cross

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, making it unnecessary for the Court to rule on the

Motions to Strike.

B. Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

The dispute currently before the Court is over whether Defendant Morinda achieved substantial completion prior to the required deadline. Defendants argue that Defendant Morinda

¹⁰FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2).

¹¹Docket No. 44; Docket No. 60.

¹²Docket No. 45, at 2.

¹³Docket No. 61, at 2; *see also id.* at 3, 4 (stating that, with regard to the Supplemental Declaration, "Sargent continues to opine on the law and draw legal conclusions").

was issued temporary certificate of occupancy by a Summit County Building Inspector on September 16, 2008, and thereby met the requirements for substantial completion under paragraph 11 of the REPC.¹⁴ This certificate was never revoked and there is no evidence that it was issued in bad faith.

Plaintiff argues that substantial completion was not achieved because Summit County did not issue a valid certificate of occupancy prior to the completion deadline.¹⁵ Plaintiff also argues that the "purported temporary certificate of occupancy was not issued by Summit County," "was issued improperly, was totally invalid, and did not evidence that substantial completion had been timely achieved by Morinda."¹⁶

Plaintiff's argument relies on the testimony of the Summit County Community

Development Director, Mr. Sargent. He supervises the chief building official who employs the building inspector that issued the TCO.¹⁷ In addition to the statements discussed below, on February 2, 2009, Mr. Sargent signed a declaration opining that the TCO issued September 16, 2008, was invalid. However, as noted above, the TCO had already expired and a certificate of occupancy whose validity has not been disputed had already been issued in December 2009.

¹⁴Docket No. 31, Ex. A ¶ 11 (stating that "The Condominium Unit shall be considered 'Substantially Complete' when a temporary or permanent certificate of occupancy for the Condominium Unit has been issued by Summit County.").

¹⁵See Docket No. 50, at 3–5.

 $^{^{16}}Id$. at 2.

¹⁷Docket No. 53, at 1, 4.

Mr. Sargent has two declarations on file with the Court.¹⁸ Plaintiff relies on Mr.

Sargent's assertions that no valid certificate of occupancy was properly issued in September 2008.¹⁹ "Rather, the TCOs issued in September were merely 'one step in the approval process for a certificate of occupancy.'*²⁰ Mr. Sargent stated that "certificates of occupancy" should not be issued under the provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development Code unless "[t]he structure has been constructed in compliance with all applicable provisions of this title and the development permit granting approval thereof, the international building code, the international fire code, and/or other applicable ordinances related to the construction and occupancy of the structure."²¹ Mr. Sargent also stated, without citing any accompanying law, that this determination "necessarily requires the approval of the Planning Department, Fire Department, and others."²² Mr. Sargent further stated that, because the TCO was not "approved by the Summit County Planning Department, Fire Department, Water Department, or Water Reclamation, [it] did not satisfy the requirement for issuance of a certificate of occupancy within The Canyons SPA."²³ Finally, Mr. Sargent stated, once again with no citation, that "it is a

¹⁸Sargent Declaration, Docket No. 31, Ex. E; Supplemental Sargent Declaration, Docket No. 53.

 $^{^{19}} Docket$ No. 50 (citing Supplemental Sargent Declaration, Docket No. 53 ¶¶ 19, 21, 23, 24, 25).

²⁰*Id.* (citing Supplemental Sargent Declaration, Docket No. 53 ¶ 23).

 $^{^{21}}$ Supplemental Sargent Declaration, Docket No. 53 \P 17 (citing Docket No. 53, Ex. J, \S 10-3-20(I)).

 $^{^{22}}Id.$

 $^{^{23}}$ *Id.* ¶ 21.

requirement of and the general practice under The Canyons SPA Development Agreement to obtain the Resort Village Management Association approval and sign off before issuance of a certificate of occupancy."²⁴

As Defendants note, Plaintiff's argument that the TCO is invalid because it does not meet Mr. Sargent's requirements is deficient. Plaintiff cites Mr. Sargent's statement that the TCO "did not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a certificate of occupancy" and then further states that "[n]o Certificate of Occupancy supported by all required approvals was properly issued in September 2008." However, these statements all relate to the requirements to obtain a certificate of occupancy, which Defendants acknowledge was not issued until December. The issue in this case is whether a *temporary* certificate of occupancy was issued prior to the deadline, as this is sufficient for substantial completion.²⁷

Plaintiff defends the Sargent Declarations by stating that certificates of occupancy have one standard, as the Snyderville Basin Development Code does not make a distinction between temporary and permanent certificates.²⁸ However, Mr. Sargent stated in his declaration that "the

 $^{^{24}}Id.$ ¶ 18.

²⁵Docket No. 31 ¶ 14.

 $^{^{26}}Id.$ ¶ 16.

²⁷See also Docket No. 40, at 18 (Defendants noting that "Sargent's carefully worded Declaration is directed only at the rules for obtaining a 'certificate of occupancy,' not a TCO. Certainly in the instant case, all that is at issue is the TCO obtained on September 16, 2008, not the certificate of occupancy, which has not been challenged and was obtained on December 16, 2008. Plaintiff, however, is attempting to take the Sargent Declarations out of context and argue its applicability to the issuance of TCOs.") (citation omitted).

²⁸Docket No. 50, at 7.

TCOs issued in September" were "one step in the required approval process for a certificate of occupancy."²⁹ This clearly establishes that there is a distinction between temporary and permanent certificates of occupancy.

Furthermore, the International Building Code ("IBC"), which has been adopted by Summit County,³⁰ allows temporary certificates of occupancy, stating that "[t]he building official is authorized to issue a temporary certificate of occupancy before the completion of the entire work covered by the permit, provided that such portion or portions shall be occupied safely."³¹

In addition to these weaknesses in Plaintiff's argument, both Plaintiff and Mr. Sargent indirectly concede that a temporary certificate of occupancy for the unit was issued in September. Mr. Sargent concedes that "a 'Temporary Certificate of Occupancy' . . . was issued by a building inspector from the Summit County Building Department," but qualified this fact by stating that the inspector "was unaware of the requirement of written approval by the Summit County Planning Department." Plaintiff also argues that the building inspector "[did] not have the authority to issue a certificate of occupancy."

However, even if this temporary certificate of occupancy was issued in error, it was issued by a building inspector who, under the IBC, "is authorized to issue a temporary certificate

²⁹Docket No. 53 ¶ 23.

³⁰Summit County Code § 9-1-1 (2008).

³¹International Building Code, Docket No. 40, Ex. 1 § 110.3.

 $^{^{32}}$ Sargent Declaration, Docket No. 31, Ex. E ¶ 9.

³³Docket No. 50, at 4.

of occupancy."³⁴ Plaintiff has not cited any local law or ordinance taking this authority away from building inspectors. Finally, this temporary certificate of occupancy was not revoked by the inspector or the County before the permanent certificate of occupancy was issued.

Mr. Sargent further acknowledged that a temporary certificate was issued when he stated that "the TCOs issued in September by the Summit County Building Department represented a conditional approval by only the Summit County Building Department." Plaintiff also cites this same language, 36 and has never argued that the temporary certificate was issued in bad faith. Labeling the document a "purported TCO" does not make it so.

Because a temporary certificate of occupancy was issued within the time specified in the contract and the contract expressly states that a temporary certificate of occupancy fulfills the "substantially complete" requirement, the Court finds that Defendants met their obligations and that their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is appropriate.

V. Conclusion

Defendants have met their burden of showing that there are no disputed issues of material fact relating to whether substantial completion, as evidenced by the issuance of a temporary certificate of occupancy, was achieved prior to the deadline. Therefore, as a matter of law, they are entitled to partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claims.

³⁴International Building Code, Docket No. 40, Ex. 1 § 110.3.

 $^{^{35}}$ Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis added); Supplemental Sargent Declaration, Docket No. 53 ¶ 17 (containing the same statement).

³⁶Docket No. 31, at 5; Docket No. 50, at 3.

It is therefore

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 30) is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that Defendants' Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 39) is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Strike (Docket Nos. 44 & 60) are DENIED AS MOOT.

DATED May 17, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

TED STEWART

United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

ALLEN WOLFSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

MAY 1 7 2010

D. MARK JONES, CLERK

DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Case No. 2:09-CV-223

Judge Dee Benson

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation issued by United States Magistrate Judge Paul Warner on April 13, 2010, recommending that Plaintiff's case be dismissed. The parties were notified of their right to file objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days after receiving it.¹ Neither party has filed such an objection.

Having reviewed all relevant materials, including the reasoning set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation and DISMISSES Plaintiff's case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 14th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT

Dee Benson, Judge

United States District Court

ensor

¹Notice of the Report and Recommendation was delivered via mail to the Plaintiff at his address of record and returned undeliverable. The court finds that service at his address of record gave the Plaintiff adequate notice. Plaintiff has not provided the court with any updated address.

FILED USUS STREET COURT

2010 MAY 17 A 10: 05

HARRY FULLTER

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Attorneys for Defendant, Trustees of the Utah Carpenters' and Cement Masons' Pension Trust

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF UTAH

CASE NO. 2:09-CV-00541-DAK FETZER'S, INC., Plaintiff. ORDER OF EXTENSION OF TIME FOR THE PARTIES' TO FILE THEIR v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPPOSITION TRUSTEES OF THE UTAH CARPENTERS' **MEMORANDA** AND CEMENT MASONS' PENSION TRUST, Defendants. TRUSTEES OF THE UTAH CARPENTERS' AND CEMENT MASONS' PENSION TRUST, Counterclaim PlaintiffS. v. FETZER'S INC.,

Counterclaim Defendant.

Based on the Stipulated Motion of the parties and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED that the date for submission of the parties' Opposition Memoranda in connection with their Motion(s) for Summary Judgment shall be extended from April 30, 2010 to May 28, 2010 to facilitate the parties' current settlement negotiations.

DATED this / day of April, 2010.

U.S. District Court Judge Clark Waddoups

Order Prepared By:

Barry N. Johnson (Utah Bar No. 6255) Daniel K. Brough (Utah Bar No. 10283) BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE

3165 E. Millrock Drive, Suite 500

Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 Telephone: (801) 438-2000 Facsimile: (801) 438-2050

Email: bjohnson@btjd.com, dbrough@btjd.com

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

***** TRUSTEES OF THE EIGHTH DISTRICT ORDER GRANTING STIPULATED ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND; and MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD FOR DEFENDANTS TO FILE OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO [30] PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION 354. FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY Plaintiffs, **JUDGMENT** v. Case No. 2:09-cv-00632 WASATCH FRONT ELECTRIC AND Judge Clark Waddoups CONSTRUCTION, LLC; LARSEN ELECTRIC, LLC; and SCOTT R. Magistrate Judge Brooke Wells LARSEN, individually; Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Stipulated Motion to Extend Deadline for Defendants to File Memorandum in Opposition to [30] Plaintiff's Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the "Stipulated Motion"), filed by Defendants Wasatch Front Electric and

* * * * * * * *

Construction, LLC ("WF Electric"), Larsen Electric, LLC ("Larsen Electric"), and Scott R.

Larsen ("Larsen" and, with WF Electric and Larsen Electric, "Defendants"), with the stipulation of Plaintiffs Trustees of the Eighth District Electrical Pension Fund (the "Fund") and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 354 ("Local 354" and, with the Fund, "Plaintiffs"). The Court notes Plaintiffs' stipulation to the relief requested in the Stipulated Motion. Good cause appearing therefrom, the Court therefore ORDERS as follows:

The Stipulated Motion is GRANTED. Defendants shall have until Wednesday, May 19, 2010, to file their memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 30).

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Hon. Brooke C. Wells

Magistrate Judge, United States District Court

E. Wells

District of Utah

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

LUTRON ELECTRONICS CO., INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CRESTRON ELECTRONICS, INC., a New Jersey corporation; FACE GROUP, INC., D.B.A. LIFESTYLE ELECTRONICS, a Utah corporation; LAVA CORP., a Utah corporation, and AUDIOVISION SYSTEMS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING JOINT AGREED MOTION TO MODIFY SCHEDULE

Civil No.: 2:09-cv-707

Judge Dee Benson

Magistrate Brooke C. Wells

The Court, having reviewed the parties' Joint Agreed Motion to Modify Schedule, and having been duly advised in the premises, hereby grants the parties' motion. As such, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

the Court's Scheduling Order dated March 1, 2010 (Dkt. 34) is modified as set forth below:

Description	Date
Defendants' Invalidity and	07/02/2010
Non-Infringement Contentions	
Exchange of proposed terms	7/30/2010
for construction	
Exchange of preliminary	08/27/2010
claim constructions and	
extrinsic evidence	
Joint Claim Construction and	09/17/2010
Pre-Hearing Statement	
Close of Claim Construction	10/01/2010
Discovery	

	I
Opening Claim Construction	10/15/2010
Brief	
Responsive Claim	11/12/2010
Construction Brief	
Reply Claim Construction	12/03/2010
Brief	12,03,2010
Claim Construction hearing	12/03/2010
requested as soon as possible	12/03/2010
after	
Rule 26(a)(2) Reports From	
Experts:	01/01/0011
Plaintiff	01/21/2011
Defendant	01/21/2011
Counter Reports	02/18/2011
Discovery to be completed by:	
Fact Discovery	02/25/2011
Expert Discovery	04/15/2011
Deadline for filing dispositive	04/29/2011
or potentially dispositive	
motions	
Rule 26(a)(3) Pretrial	
Disclosures	
Plaintiff	06/24/2011
Defendant	07/08/2011
Special Attorney Conference ¹	07/22/2011
on or before	
Settlement Conference ² on or	07/22/2011
before	01, 22, 2011
Final Pretrial Conference	08/12/2011
Trial (Jury Trial, 12 days)	09/12/2011
	(subject to
	Court's

¹ The Special Attorneys Conference does not involve the Court. Counsel will agree on *voir dire* questions, jury instructions, a pre-trial order and discuss the presentation of the case. Witnesses will be scheduled to avoid gaps and disruptions. Exhibits will be marked in a way that does not result in duplication of documents. Any special equipment or courtroom requirements will be included in the pre-trial order.

² The Settlement Conference does not involve the Court unless a separate order is entered. Counsel must ensure that a person or representative with full settlement authority or otherwise authorized to make decisions regarding settlement is available in person or by telephone during the Settlement Conference.

All dates and provisions not modified herein remain in full force and effect as set forth in the Court's Scheduling Order dated March 1, 2010 (Dkt. 34); and

Defendants' Expedited Motion for Extension of Briefing Schedule (Dkt. 51) is withdrawn without prejudice.

Dated: May 17, 2010

Srooke C. Wells

United States Magistrate Judge

200 TAY 14 TO 20 5%

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

CENTRAL DIVISION

BRYANT ALLRED, : SCHEDULING ORDER

Plaintiff,

:

VS.

FAIRVIEW CITY, SPENCER COX, in his official and individual capacity,

and JOHN DOES I-V.

Civil No. 2:09CV866BSJ

Defendant. : Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins

The above-referenced matter, having come before the Court for an initial pretrial scheduling conference, with Plaintiff being represented by David J. Holdsworth, and Defendants being represented by Meb W. Anderson, of the law firm of Blaisdell and Church, P.C., and the Court, having reviewed the Report of Attorney Planning Meeting and Proposed Scheduling Order submitted by the parties, hereby adopts the same to govern the further processing of the case, with the following revisisions and additions highlighted as target dates:

Discovery Cutoff:

March 30, 2010

Submission of Final Pretrial Order:

May 18, 2011, 5:00 p.m.

Final Pretrial Conference:

May 20, 2011, 9:30 a.m.

DATED this $\frac{17}{1}$ day of May, 2010.

Bruce S. Jenkins
U.S. Senior District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

2010 HAY 17 A 10: 05

PAUL STEPHENSON,

Plaintiff,

VS.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Case No. 2:09-cv-0905 CW-SA

District Judge Clark Waddoups

Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba

This case was assigned to United States District Court Judge Clark Waddoups, who then referred it to United States Magistrate Samuel Alba under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On March 26, 2010, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Motion to Dismiss be granted. Plaintiff Paul Stephenson filed no objection to the Report and Recommendation. After having reviewed the file *de novo*, the court hereby APPROVES AND ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in its entirety. Accordingly, the FBI's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED this / 7 day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Clark Waddoups

United States District Judge

¹ Docket No. 9.

² Docket No. 5.

W.S. PERSONAL COURT

Philip J. Hardy (6742) Hardy & Hardy, P.C. 1981 Murray Holladay Road, Suite 225 Salt Lake City, UT 84117 Telephone: (801) 293-3314 Attorneys for Defendants:

- Michael J. Lichtie:
- Caliber Homes, LLC



MAY 1 4 2010

OFFICE OF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE BRUCE S. JENKINS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DIVISION

STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington state chartered bank,

Plaintiff.

VS.

CENTRE SQUARE ONE, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; MICHAEL J. LICHTIE, an individual; DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; BRENT D. BUTCHER and KRISTAL BUTCHER, husband and wife; PERFORMANCE CONSTRUCTION INC., a Utah corporation; CALIBER HOMES L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; and CALIBER HOLDINGS COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company,

Defendants.

MICHAEL J. LICHTIE, an individual, and CALIBER HOMES L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company,

Counter Claimants.

VS.

STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington state chartered bank,

Counterclaim Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL

Case No. 2:09-cv-916

Judge Bruce S. Jenkins

COMES NOW the Court, which, having held a hearing regarding Defendants Lichtie and Caliber Homes, LLC's attorney's Application to Withdraw as Counsel made pursuant to DUCivR 83-1.4 ATTORNEYS - WITHDRAWAL OR REMOVAL OF ATTORNEY, which hearing was held on Wednesday, May 5, 2010 at the hour of 1:30 p.m., where both counsel for Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants Lichtie & Caliber appeared on behalf of their clients, and having also received Defendants' Consent to Withdrawal, and further, it appearing opposing counsel has consented to withdrawal of Defendants' counsel, the court, having reviewed the file and being fully apprised in the premises, the Court GRANTED attorney Philip J. Hardy's application to withdraw, subject to his preparing this new Order. Wherefore, based on the above, the Court hereby makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court finds that:

- 1. There is good cause showing for allowing Defendants' counsel to withdraw at this time in that
 - A. Defendants are incapable of adequately compensating counsel, therefore making it impossible for counsel to competently, adequately, and timely represent Defendants' interests;
 - B. Defendants' counsel is having difficulty in getting Defendants to cooperate with him in timely answering or otherwise responding to discovery and other requests of opposing counsel;
 - C. Defendants' counsel is in the process of accepting other employment, thereby requiring him to withdraw from this, and other of his presently-active cases;
 - D. Opposing counsel, Mark Williams, has given his consent to withdrawal of Defendants' counsel.
 - E. Federal law in the Utah District requires businesses to be represented by counsel, and not to appear pro se.

2. This court has authority pursuant to statute to grant the withdrawal of attorneys from cases before this court.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the following:

ORDER

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that:

- Counsel for Defendants Lichtie and Caliber Homes, LLC, namely Philip J.
 Hardy, of HARDY & HARDY, P.C.'s Application to Withdraw as Counsel, is hereby
 GRANTED twenty days from entry of this Order.
- 2. Caliber Homes, LLC, is to obtain new counsel who should enter their appearance and provide an address for correspondence. Archive should a suppose the control of the co

delivered to:

Caliber Homes, LLC c/o Steven W. Dougherty, Registered Agent 50 West Broadway, Suite 700 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

2. All further correspondence for Michael J. Lichtie should be directed

to:

Michael J. Lichtie PO Box 9313 Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 (801) 979-7507.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE BRUCE S. VENKINS
United States District Court Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

NEDRA RONEY McKELL, an individual, and ROBERT McKELL, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GARY WHITING, an individual; CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN ENTERTAINMENT, a Nevada corporation; GARVICK PROPERTIES, a Nevada Limited Liability Company, CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN GAMES, a Nevada corporation; MMOGULS, a Nevada corporation; NOW CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation,

Defendants.

MAY 1 7 2010

D. MARK JONES, CLERK

ORDER

Case No. 2:09-CV-918

Judge Dee Benson

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs' application for attorneys' fees. (*See* Dkt. No. 17.) On March 17, 2010, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to remand and awarded the plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result of the defendants' removal. (*See* Dkt. No. 14.) On April 14, 2010, plaintiffs filed the instant application seeking \$3,300.00 in attorneys' fees. The defendants did not file an opposition.

The court has carefully considered the plaintiffs' application. The court finds that plaintiffs have provided the court with sufficient evidence to support and evaluate their claimed fees. The court also finds that the claimed fees are reasonable. Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees in the amount of \$3,300.00.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

Dee Benson

United States District Judge

Dee Benson

U.S. EXSTRUCT COURT

2010 MAY 17 P 2: 38

Dale J. Lambert, #1871
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
Dale.Lambert@chrisjen.com
Attorneys for Reed Hurst Trucking, Inc.

BISTMOT OF UTAH BY: DEPUTY CLEAK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

AARON OLMSTEAD,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BILL BARRETT CORPORATION; ZEIS CONSULTING SERVICES, INC.; RUSSELL EVANS, INDIVIDUALLY; THE BOC GROUP, INC.; PRAXAIR, INC.; AND REED HURST TRUCKING, INC.,

Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

Case No.: 2:09-cv-01044

Judge Tena Campbell Magistrate Judge David O. Nuffer

Based on the Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice of the parties, and good cause appearing therefore, Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice, each of the parties to bear their own attorney's fees and costs of court incurred herein.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Tena Campbell U.S. District Court Judge

HE THE COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTED MAY 14 P 3: 17

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION (1987) AND THE STATE OF UTAH, CENTRAL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

2:10 CR 0039 CW

Plaintiff,

ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL AND

EXCLUDING TIME FROM SPEEDY

VS.

:

CRISTOFER SANCHEZ-VASQUEZ,

.

Defendant.

Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba

TRIAL ACT COMPUTATION

This matter came before the Court on May 13, 2010 for a status conference. Counsel, Richard Mauro, appeared for the defendant. Assistant United States Attorney Robert A. Lund appeared for the United States.

The Court heard discussion regarding the status of the case, and being now fully advised, the Court hereby enters the following ORDER:

The Court will convene a jury trial in the matter to commence on July 26, 2010. It is further ORDERED pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) and (7)(A) and (B)(ii) that all time between May 13, 2010 and July 26, 2010, shall be excluded from computation of time under the Speedy Trial Act.

The Court finds that such time is excluded from computation under the terms of the Speedy Trial Act, and finds further that the ends of justice served by the date of this trial setting outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. Additionally, the

court finds that the nature of the prosecution is unusual and complex to a degree that it would be unreasonable to expect adequate trial preparation within the time limits established by the Speedy Trial Act. The court makes these findings based on the fact that the case against the defendant relates to multiple long-term wiretap investigations which involve extremely voluminous discovery, and counsel requires additional time to finish his review of the materials. Counsel further requires additional time to have materials translated from Spanish to English, including statements made by the defendant, and then to review those materials with the defendant.

DATED this ______ day of May, 2010.

SAMUEL ALBA

United States Magistrate Judge

CARLIE CHRISTENSEN, Acting United States Attorney (No. 633) MATTHEW L. BELL, Assistant United States Attorney (No. 9840) Attorneys for the United States of America

20 North Main Street, Suite 208

St. George, Utah 84770

Telephone: (435) 673-0712

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

MAY 1 7 2010

D. MARK JOWES, CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ORDER TOLLING TIME UNDER

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER: 2:10-CR-00101-TS

VS.

TIMOTHY JOSEPH ADKINS,

Magistrate Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

Defendant.

Based upon the Government's Stipulated Motion to Toll Time Under Speedy Trial Act and the facts set forth therein, this Court finds good cause for tolling of time under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(G). The Court has received a copy of a Statement in Advance of Plea of guilty, and defendant's Change-of-Plea hearing has been set, at defendant's request, for June 28, 2010.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time between defendant's May 14, 2010, request to enter into a plea agreement and the change-of-plea hearing now set for June 28, 2010, is hereby tolled for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(G).

Dated this	17	day of	11/	Pai	1	2010.
_				/		

BY THE COURT:

ROBERT T. BRAITHWAITE United States Magistrate Judge

©AO 245B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Central Division	District of	Utah
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V.	JUDGMENT CHUTAN	IN A CRIMINAL CASE
Franklin Velasquez-Paredez	DEPUTY OF Case Number:	DUTX2:10CR000164-001
	USM Number:	16861-081
	Carlos Garcia,	FPD
THE DEFENDANT:	Defendant's Attorney	y
pleaded guilty to count(s) I of indictmen	t	
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was accepted by the court.		
was found guilty on count(s) after a plea of not guilty.		
The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offer	nses:	
Title & Section Nature of Offens 8 USC Sec. 1326 Reentry of a Pr	e reviously Removed Alien	Offense Ended Count 1
The defendant is sentenced as provided in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.	n pages 2 through of t	this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to
☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on c	ount(s)	
Count(s)	is are dismissed on the	ne motion of the United States.
It is ordered that the defendant must not or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs the defendant must notify the court and United S	ify the United States attorney for this d s, and special assessments imposed by t states attorney of material changes in e	listrict within 30 days of any change of name, residence, his judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, economic circumstances.
	5/12/2010	
	Date of Imposition of	- Campuell
	Signature of Judge	
	Tena Campbe	U.S. District Judge Title of Judge
	5-14- Date	2010

AO 245B

2 Judgment — Page

10

DEFENDANT: Franklin Velasquez-Paredez CASE NUMBER: DUTX2:10CR000164-001

IMPRISONMENT

total t	The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a erm of:
24 m	nonths.
	The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
The	court recommends defendant be placed in a facility in Phoenix, Arizona.
¥	The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
	The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:
	□ at □ □ a.m. □ p.m. on □
	as notified by the United States Marshal.
	The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:
ш	
	as notified by the United States Marshal.
	as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.
	DETUDN
	RETURN
I have	executed this judgment as follows:
	Defendant delivered on to
at	, with a certified copy of this judgment.
	UNITED STATES MARSHAL
	ONLES STATES MARGITAL
	By
	DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

(Rev. 06/05) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3 - Supervised Release

DEFENDANT: Franklin Velasquez-Paredez CASE NUMBER: DUTX2:10CR000164-001

Judgment-Page 10 3

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of:

36 months.

The defendant must report to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall register with the state sex offender registration agency in the state where the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (Check, if applicable.)

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional conditions on the attached page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer; 1)
- the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of 2) each month;
- the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer; 3)
- the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities; 4)
- the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other 5) acceptable reasons;
- the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment; 6)
- the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any 7) controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered; 8)
- the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any 10) contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer; 11)
- the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and
- as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

Judgment—Page 4 of 10

DEFENDANT: Franklin Velasquez-Paredez CASE NUMBER: DUTX2:10CR000164-001

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1. The defendant shall not illegally reenter the United States.

AO 245B

DEFENDANT: Franklin Velasquez-Paredez CASE NUMBER: DUTX2:10CR000164-001

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

Judgment - Page

of

10

5

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

TOT	ΓALS \$	Assessment 100.00		\$	<u>Fine</u> 0.00	\$	Restituti 0.00	<u>on</u>	
	The determina after such dete		on is deferred un	til Aı	n <i>Amended Jud</i> ş	gment in a Crimi	inal Case	(AO 245C) w	rill be entered
	The defendant	must make res	titution (includin	g community re	estitution) to the f	following payees i	n the amo	unt listed belo	w.
	If the defendar the priority or before the Uni	nt makes a parti der or percenta ited States is pa	al payment, each ge payment columid.	n payee shall red mn below. How	ceive an approxim wever, pursuant to	nately proportioned to 18 U.S.C. § 366	d payment 4(i), all no	, unless specif infederal victin	ied otherwise in ns must be paid
Nan	ne of Payee				Total Loss*	Restitution (Ordered	Priority or I	Percentage
	Salah salah salah salah Balah	and the second	sacionalización	Section Control of Con	TATE	national C	1	C 1467	grosses gress (ill. 1978)
	raksonviko asator Malaista (hali d	Free Control of the C				AT RESP.		, min 3228	
				AND THE REAL PROPERTY.		III III Manari 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
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TO	ΓALS		S	0.00	\$	0.00			
	Restitution ar	mount ordered p	oursuant to plea	agreement \$ _					
	fifteenth day	after the date of		oursuant to 18 U	J.S.C. § 3612(f).	, unless the restitu All of the paymer			
	The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:								
	the interest requirement is waived for the fine restitution.								
	☐ the interes	est requirement	for the 🔲 🖠	fine 🗌 rest	itution is modifie	d as follows:			

^{*} Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

AO 245B

DEFENDANT: Franklin Velasquez-Paredez CASE NUMBER: DUTX2:10CR000164-001

Judgment — Page 10

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Hav	ing a	issessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties are due as follows:
A	\checkmark	Lump sum payment of \$ 100.00 due immediately, balance due
		not later than in accordance C, D, E, or F below; or
В		Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with C, D, or F below); or
C	□.	Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or
D	□	Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or
E		Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or
F	\checkmark	Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:
		Special Assessment Fee of \$100 is due immediately.
		ne court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during ment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial ibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court. Indant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.
	Join	nt and Several
		Fendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, corresponding payee, if appropriate.
	The	e defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
	The	e defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):
	The	defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

Pages — - 10

are the

Statement of Reasons,
which will be docketed
separately as a sealed
document

United States District Court District of Utah

INITED	STATES OF AMERICA	

The defendant is placed on Probation for a period of _ The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	(For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987)
VS.	THE REPORT OF THE PROPERTY OF
Steven O. Straw	Case Number: DUTX 210CR000171-001
	Plaintiff Attorney: Stanley H. Olsen
	Defendant Attorney: Pro Se
	Atty: CJA Ret FPD
Last 4 - Dft's Soc. Sec. No: 3937	
Defendant's Year of Birth: 1980	5/6/2010
Defendant's USM No.: N/A	Date of Imposition of Sentence
Defendant's Residence Address:	Defendant's Mailing Address:
Comet Cir	Comet Cir
Salt Lake City, UT 84124	Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Country USA	Country USA
THE DEFENDANT: pleaded guilty to count(s)	COPVerdict <u>5/6/2010</u>
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was accepted by the court.	
was found guilty on count(s) 1 of the M	lisdemeanor Information
Title & Section 43 U.S.C. §1701 Nature of Offense FEDERAL LAND POL Creating a Hazard and a (43 C.F.R. 8365.1-4(1))	
The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)	
	(is)(are) dismissed on the motion of the United States.
SEN	VTENCE
	4, it is the judgment and order of the Court that the
Upon release from confinement, the defendant sha	all be placed on supervised release for a term of

Defendant Case Num	
For	offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994: The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on probation and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation officer.
	The above drug testing condition is suspended based on the court's determination that the defendant possesses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check if applicable.)
	SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE/PROBATION
PRC	In addition to all Standard Conditions of (Supervised Release or Probation) set forth in OBATION FORM 7A, the following Special Conditions are imposed: (see attachment if necessary)
	1.
	CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES
	FINE
The	defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of \$ 75.00 , payable as follows:
	in accordance with the Bureau of Prison's Financial Responsibility Program while incarcerated and thereafter pursuant to a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court.
	in accordance with a schedule established by the U.S. Probation office, based upon the defendant's ability to pay and with the approval of the court.
	other:
	The defendant shall pay interest on any fine more than \$2,500, unless the fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f).
	The court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3), it is ordered that:
	☐ The interest requirement is waived.
	The interest requirement is modified as follows:
	RESTITUTION
	The defendant shall make restitution to the following payees in the amounts listed below:
N	Amount of Amount of Loss Restitution Ordered

Defendant:

Steven O. Straw

Case Number: 210CR000171-001

Amount of

Name and Address of Payee	Amount	of Loss	Restitution Ordered
Totals:	\$	\$_	
(See attachment if necessary.) All restitution payments must otherwise. If the defendant makes a partial payment, each punless otherwise specified.			
Restitution is payable as follows:			
in accordance with a schedule established defendant's ability to pay and with the app			ice, based upon the
other:			
☐ The defendant having been convicted of an offens on or after 04/25/1996, determination of mandator pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)(not to exceed ☐ An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case	ry restitution 90 days after	is continued r sentencing).	until
SPECIAL AS	SESSMEN	Γ	
The defendant shall pay a special assessment in the are forthwith.	mount of \$	25.00	, payable as follows:
			·
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines this judgment are fully paid			
PRESENTENCE REP	ORT/OBJI	ECTIONS	
The court adopts the factual findings and guidelines report except as otherwise stated in open court.	application	recommended	I in the presentence
DEPAR	TURE		
The Court grant the Motion for Departure pursuant reasons for departure:	t to 18 U.S.C	C. 3553(c)(2), 1	the Court enters its
RECOMME	ENDATION	ſ	
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4), the Court ma of Prisons:	kes the follo	owing recomm	endations to the Bureau

Page 4 of 5

Defendant:

Steven O. Straw Case Number: 210CR000171-001

CUSTODY/SURRENDER

☐ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the ☐ The defendant shall surrender to the United State on	
The defendant shall report to the institution designated institution's local time, on	gnated by the Bureau of Prisons by
DATE: 5/14/2010	Robert T. Braithwaite

United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant: Steven O. Straw
Case Number: 210CR000171-001

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:				
	to	Defendant delivered on		
	, with a certified copy of this judgment.		at _	
	AD MINIST OFF STREET AND SHAPE			
	UNITED STATES MARSHAL			
	By			
	with a certified copy of this judgment. UNITED STATES MARSHAL By Deputy U.S. Marshal		at _	

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO DISMISS

MISDEMEANOR INFORMATION

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:10-CR-175

v.

Creating a Hazard and a

TYLER C. PERRY,

Nuisance (43 U.S.C. § 1701 and

43 C.F.R. 8365.1-4(a)(2))

Defendant.

Magistrate Judge Robert T.

Braithwaite

Based upon the Motion of the United States of America, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby grants the Government leave to dismiss the above-captioned Misdemeanor Information, without prejudice, under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

BY THE COURT:

tates Magistrate Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,	ORDER CONTINUING CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING
-vs-	Case No. 2:10-CR-178 TS
UBERTO LAZALDE ZUNIGA,	
Defendant.	

Based on the motion filed by the defendant and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING set for Tuesday, May 18, 2010, at 2:00 p.m. is continued until 4/21/10 @ 3:30 p.m.

DATED this 14th day of Moy, 2010.

HØNORABLE TED STEWART United States District Court Judge

United States District Court

11.75	San San		
u à T	RIC	0U	RI

	····
	District of Utah 2010 MAY 17 A 7: 11
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
v.	DISTRICT SET VIAN
JULIO CESAR ARELLANES-HERNANDEZ	Case Number: DUTX210CR000186-001
) USM Number: 34408-208
) Natalie Benson
	Defendant's Attorney
THE DEFENDANT:	
pleaded guilty to count(s) 1 of the Indictment	
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was accepted by the court.	
was found guilty on count(s) after a plea of not guilty.	·
The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:	
Title & Section Nature of Offense	Offense Ended Count
8 U.S.C. § 1326 Reentry of a Previously	Removed Alien
The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.	hrough 5 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to
☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)	
Count(s)	are dismissed on the motion of the United States.
It is ordered that the defendant must notify the Un or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and spe the defendant must notify the court and United States atto	ted States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence al assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution ney of material changes in economic circumstances.
	5/13/2010 Date of Imposition of Judgment
	,
	David Sam
	Signature of Judge
	Signature of Judge The Honorable David Sam U. S. District Judge
	Signature of Judge
	Signature of Judge The Honorable David Sam U. S. District Judge

Judgment — Page 2 of 5

DEFENDANT: JULIO CESAR ARELLANES-HERNANDEZ

CASE NUMBER: DUTX210CR000186-001DS

IMPRISONMENT

total te	The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a rm of:
60 da	ays with credit for time-served.
	The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
\checkmark	The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
	The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:
	□ at □ a.m. □ p.m. on
	as notified by the United States Marshal.
	The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:
	before 2 p.m. on
	as notified by the United States Marshal.
	as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.
	RETURN
I horro	
i nave	executed this judgment as follows:
	Defendant delivered on to
a	, with a certified copy of this judgment.
	UNITED STATES MARSHAL
	UNITED STATES MAKSHAL
	Ву
	DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEFENDANT: JULIO CESAR ARELLANES-HERNANDEZ

CASE NUMBER: DUTX210CR000186-001DS

SUPERVISED RELEASE

5

3

Judgment-Page _

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of:

12 Months

The defendant must report to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

	The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse. (Check, if applicable.)
abla	The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous weapon. (Check, if applicable.)
V	The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if applicable.)
	The defendant shall comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C. § 16901, et seq.) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which he or she resides, works, is a student, or was convicted of a qualifying offense. (Check, if applicable.)
	The defendant shall participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (Check, if applicable.)
	If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a condition of supervised release that the defendant have in accordance with the

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any additional conditions on the attached page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- 3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;
- 4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
- 5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons;
- 6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment;
- 7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician;
- 8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;
- 9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
- the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the probation officer;
- 11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;
- 12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and
- as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.

DEFENDANT: JULIO CESAR ARELLANES-HERNANDEZ

CASE NUMBER: DUTX210CR000186-001DS

Judgment—Page 4 of 5

ADDITIONAL SUPERVISED RELEASE TERMS

The defendant shall not re-enter the United States illegally. In the event that the defendant should be released from confinement without being deported, he shall contact the United States Probation Office in the district of release within 72 hours of release. If the defendant returns to the United States during the period of supervision after being deported, he is instructed to contact the United States Probation Office in the District of Utah within 72 hours of arrival in the United States.

(Rev. 09/08) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 6 — Schedule of Payments

DEFENDANT: JULIO CESAR ARELLANES-HERNANDEZ

CASE NUMBER: DUTX210CR000186-001DS

Judgment — Page ___5 of ___5

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Hav	ing a	assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:		
A		Lump sum payment of \$ due immediately, balance due		
		□ not later than		
В		Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with \square C, \square D, or \square F below); or		
C		Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or		
D		Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ over a period of (e.g., months or years), to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or		
E		Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or		
F	\checkmark	Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:		
		The Court waives the Special Assessment, and the Fine.		
		e court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during ment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financia bility Program, are made to the clerk of the court. Indant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.		
	Ioin	at and Several		
	Defe	endant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, corresponding payee, if appropriate.		
	The	defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.		
		defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):		
	The	defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:		

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and (8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

	FILED
IN THE UNITE	D STATES DISTRICT COURT. TOTAL COURT
FOR TH	THE DISTRICT OF UTAA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
Plaintiff,	Docket No.: 2:10-CR-00192-001-TC
T	
lesus Aguilar, Jr. Defendant	DEFORY CLEAN
CONSENT TO MOI	DIFY CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
	ith Pretrial Services Officer Hugo de Leon, modification of
The defendant shall be released int supervise the defendant in accordance the appearance of the defendant at all in the event the defendant violates an	to the third party custody of <u>Oswaldo Orozco</u> , who agrees (a) to se with all the conditions of release, (b) to use every effort to assure I scheduled court proceedings, and (c) to notify the court immediately by conditions of release or disappears
I consent to this modification of my re-	clease conditions and agree to abide bythis modification.
Jesus Aguilan	Pretrial Services Officer
05/07/10	
The conditions with I	ny client and concur that this modification is appropriate.
I have reviewed the conditions when a	5/12/2010
Defense Counsel	Date
ORI	DER OF THE COURT
The above modification of con	nditions of release is ordered, to be effective on
MAY 14, 2010. The above modification of co	onditions of release is <u>not</u> ordered.
fauth Warne	MAY 14 2010
Honorable Paul M. Warner	Date
United States Magistrate Judge	₩ ₩₩

United States Magistrate Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

FUE	THE DISTRICT OF CTAIL
UNITED STATES OF AMER	ICA)
Plaintiff,	
) Docket No.: 2:10-CR-00215-001-RTB
Brittany Leigh Anderer	200 MAY 17) A 9:03 .
Defendant)
CONSENT TO N	MODIFY CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
I, Brittany Leigh Anderer, have di modification of my release conditi	scussed with Pretrial Services Officer Blanca Tillman, ons as follows:
	abmit to a mental health evaluation/assessment and ment as deemed advisable by examiner and/or Pretrial g Officer
 The defendant to suit inpatient/outpatien 	ubmit to a substance abuse evaluation and participate in an t substance abuse treatment program and/or any counseling by the Pretrial Services Supervising Officer
I consent to this modification of m	y release conditions and agree to abide by this modification.
Bullany andore	Pretrial Services Officer
Defendant	Fretrial Services Officer
6/3/10	5310.
Date	Date
	100 00 000
I have reviewed the conditions with	my client and concur that this modification is appropriate.
MM XT	5/6/10
Defense Counsel	Date
Ol	RDER OF THE COURT
	1''. C. 1
The above modification of $5(1750)$, 2010.	conditions of release is ordered, to be effective on
[] The above modification of	conditions of release is not ordered.
	5/17/2010
Honorable Paul M. Warner	Date
HUMULADIC LAULIVI. WALIICI	·

We reside to

7010 TAY 17 A 10:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRIBUTE CON

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

DANIEL SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

ENCORE CREDIT CORPORATION et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Case No. 2:10-cv-43 CW

Judge Clark Waddoups

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. No party has opposed the motion. For good cause appearing, the court HEREBY GRANTS the Motion to Amend Complaint.

SO ORDERED this /4 day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Clark Waddoups


United States District Judge

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) Samantha J. Slark (#10774) 50 West Broadway, Suite 700 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2035

Telephone: (801) 534-1700 Facsimile: (801) 364-7697





IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

BEACON TOWER DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

VS.

GREAT BASIN TECHNOLOGIES, LLC., a Utah limited liability company, RICHARD R. MACKERELL, an individual, GARY M. RENLUND, an individual, TRIOX TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Utah Corporation,

Defendants.

SCHEDULING ORDER

Case No. 2:10cv00099 Judge Bruce S. Jenkins

A scheduling conference was held before the above-entitled Court on May 3, 2010. Plaintiff was represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg. The Defendants were represented by Robert Clark.

The Court hereby enters the following scheduling order:

1. The parties will exchange on or before May 28, 2010 the Initial Disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1).

2. All amendments to pleadings shall be made on or before August 1, 2010, including any motions to join additional parties.

3. Fact discovery, except for experts, shall be completed by January 31, 2011.

4. Expert reports pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) shall be submitted by Plaintiff on or before February 28, 2011, by Defendant on or before March 31, 2011, and any expert rebuttal reports on or before April 30, 2011.

5. All discovery, including expert discovery, shall be completed on or before May 31, 2011.

6. All dispositive or potentially dispositive motions and Daubert motions are to be filed with the court on or before May 1, 2011.

7. A pretrial conference shall be held before the above-entitled Court on June 24, 2011 at 9:30 a.m.

8. The parties shall submit an agreed upon form of pretrial order to the Court on or before June 22, 2011 including final witness lists and exhibits.

9. All depositions and written discovery shall be conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED: May 14, 2010.

BY THE COURT

Judge Bruce S. Jenkins

U.S. District Court Judge

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

MAY 1 7 2010
D. MARK JONES, CLERK
DEPUTY CLERK

RICHARD L. PETERSEN (9494), for: **HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.**

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

petersenr@provolawyers.com

Our File No. 30126

Attorneys for Darlene Pierce

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No. 2:10-cv-00171- DB

DARLENE PIERCE and CARON McEWAN,

Defendants.

Defendant Darlene Pierce's Motion for Summary Judgment came regularly before this Court.

The Court having reviewed said motion and finding good cause, enters the following order:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

- 1. That defendant Darlene Pierce's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
- 2. That counsel for Darlene Pierce be remitted the proceeds of the term life insurance policy previously deposited with this Court by Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company, plus

interest, less reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by Hartford, (attorney for Hartford to submit affidavit with fees and costs agreed to by Defendant Pierce).

DATED this day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Dee Benson

I:\Pierce Darlene\order granting SJ 20100426.wpd

Sally B. McMinimee (5316) sbm@princeyeates.com
Jennifer R. Korb (9147) jrk@princeyeates.com
Jared N. Parrish (11743) jnp@princeyeates.com

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

175 East 400 South, Suite 900 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Telephone: (801) 524-1000

Fax:

(801) 524-1099

Attorneys for Receiver Robert G. Wing

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

MAY 1 7 2010

D. MARK JONES, CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

ROBERT G. WING, as Receiver for VESCOR CAPITAL CORP., a Nevada corporation, et al,

Plaintiff,

vs.

NANCY A. BARNES, an individual,

Defendants.

ORDER ALLOWING SERVICE
OF PROCESS ON
NANCY A. BARNES
BY EMAIL

Civil No. 2:10-cv-189

Judge Dee Benson

This Court, having reviewed the Receiver's Motion for Order Allowing Service by Email, or Alternatively, by Publication, and the Memorandum in support thereof, and based thereon and good cause otherwise appearing it is, hereby,

ORDERED as follows:

- The Receiver's Motion for Order Allowing Service by Email is GRANTED.
- 2. Upon delivery of the summons and the complaint to Defendant

Nancy A. Barnes by email at nab929@live.com, service of process on Defendant Barnes shall be deemed complete.

DATED this $/2^{\uparrow\uparrow}$ day of /2, 2010.

HONORABLE DEE BENSON DISTRICT COURT JUDGE WILLARD K. TOM
General Counsel
CHRISTOPHER KOEGEL
GREGORY A. ASHE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., NJ-3158
Washington, DC 20580
(202) 326-2761 (Koegel)
(202) 326-3719 (Ashe)
(202) 326-3768 (facsimile)

Email: ckoegel@ftc.gov, gashe@ftc.gov

Attorneys for Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARK LOFGREN,

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR DEFENDANT MARK LOFGREN TO ANSWER, MOVE, OR OTHERWISE RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

Case No.: 2:10 CV 00225 DAK

Judge Dale A. Kimball

Based upon Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Stipulated Motion for Extension of Time for Defendant Mark Lofgren to Answer, Move, or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiff's Complaint and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant Mark Lofgren shall have an additional 30 days to answer, move, or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint in the above matter.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

Dale A. Kimball

United States District Judge

U.S. ENSTRICT COURT

2000 KAY 17 A II: 55

MATERIAL MIGHTEN

BY DEPUTY OLERA

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Attorneys for Standard Industries, Inc., and C.O.P. Coal Development Company

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

In re:

C. W. MINING COMPANY

Debtor.

KENNETH A. RUSHTON, Trustee,

Plaintiff,

v.

C.O.P. COAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

ET AL.

District Court No. 2:10-cv-00269-TS District Court No. 2:10-cv-00288-TS

Bankruptcy Case No. 08B-20105

Adversary Proceeding No. 09-02248

ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE OF BRIEF DEADLINE

[Filed Electronically]

The parties' Stipulation for Continuance of Brief Deadline having been filed herein, and the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby: ORDERED that the deadline for filing Appellant's opening brief in the above-captioned bankruptcy appeal is continued until June 17, 2010.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE TED STEWART

2

U.S. ENSTRICT COURT

2000 KAY 17 A II: 55

MATERIAL MIGHTEN

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DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE TED STEWART

2

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

MAY 17 2010

D.	MARK	JONES	CLERK
V			,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT UTAH

CENTRAL DIVISION

Pantone,)
) ORDER OF RECUSAL
Plaintiff,	
v.) Case No. 2:10CV454
Royal Hansen, et al.,	
Defendants.	

I recuse myself in this case, and ask that the appropriate assignment card equalization be drawn by the clerk's office.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

DALE A. KIMBALL United States District Judge

Salo a. Kuball

Judge Campbell